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The integrity of the upright guides them,
but the crookedness of the treacherous destroys them.
Proverbs 11:3.
Introduction
In 2001, the Supreme Court opened up the possibility that
arbitration, rather than adjudication, would become the standard
means of resolving statutory employment disputes for most American
workers. A decade earlier, the Court had decided in Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,' that the Federal Arbitration Act
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1. 500 U.S. 20 (1991). The high stakes involved in Gilmer unleashed an avalanche of
commentary. See, e.g., Reginald Alleyne, Statutory Discrimination Claims: Rights
"Waived" and Lost in the Arbitration Forum, 13 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 381 (1996); Mark
Berger, Can Employment Law Arbitration Work?, 61 U.M.K.C L. REV. 693 (1993); Mei
Bickner et al., Developments in Employment Arbitration, 52 DISP. RESOL. J. 68 (1997);
Samuel Estreicher, Predispute Agreements to Arbitrate Statutory Employment Claims, 72
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1344 (1997); David E. Feller, Putting Gilmer Where It Belongs: The
FAA's Labor Exemption, 18 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 253 (2000); Matthew W. Finkin,
"Workers' Contracts" Under the United States Arbitration Act: An Essay in Historical
[311]
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("FAA") made an employee's arbitration agreement at the time of
hire enforceable as a waiver of his right to sue his employer for age
discrimination under a federal statute in federal court.2 But many
believed that Gilmer's impact would be limited by the FAA's
exemption of "workers engaged in ... interstate commerce. ',3 The
Supreme Court dashed those hopes in Circuit City Stores, Inc. v.
Adams, by narrowly interpreting the exemption to apply "only to
contracts of employment of transportation workers."4  And even
though the Court ruled recently in EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc.,' that
an employee's arbitration agreement does not preclude the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission from suing for an injunction
as well as victim-specific relief on behalf of such an employee, this
Clarification, 17 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 282 (1996); Robert A. Gorman, The
Gilmer Decision and the Private Arbitration of Public Law Disputes, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV.
635 (1995); Joseph R. Grodin, Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Claims:
Doctrine and Policy in the Wake of Gilmer, 14 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 1 (1996); Ira F. Jaffe,
The Arbitration of Statutory Disputes: Procedural and Substantive Considerations, 45
N.A.A. PROC. 110 (1993); Pierre Levy, Gilmer Revisited: The Judicial Erosion of
Employee Statutory Rights, 26 N.M. L. REV. 455 (1996); Martin H. Malin, Arbitrating
Statutory Employment Claims in the Aftermath of Gilmer, 40 ST. Louis U. L.J. 77 (1996);
Lewis Maltby, Paradise Lost-How the Gilmer Court Lost the Opportunity for Alternative
Dispute Resolution to Improve Civil Rights, 12 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 1 (1994); Calvin
William Sharpe, Adjusting the Balance Between Public Rights and Private Process: Gilmer
v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corporation, 45 N.A.A. PROC. 161 (1993); Jean R. Sternlight,
Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court's Preference for Binding
Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637 (1996); Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Mandatory
Arbitration of Individual Employment Rights: The Yellow Dog Contract of the 1990s, 73
DENV. U. L. REV. 1017 (1996).
2. Section 2 of the FAA reads in part:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a
transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy
thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction ... shall be valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in
equity for the revocation of any contract.
9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
The statute proscribing age discrimination is the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1967).
3. Section 1 of the FAA reads in part, "but nothing herein contained shall apply to
contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers
engaged in foreign or interstate commerce." 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2002). See, e.g., Finkin, supra
note 1 (offering a historical basis for a broad interpretation of the exemption).
4. 532 U.S. 105, 119 (2001). Of the 132,000,000 employees on nonfarm payrolls in
February 2001, only 4,593,000, or 3%, are transportation workers. See UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, THE EMPLOYMENT
SITUATION: FEBRUARY 2001, available at ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/news.release/History/
empsit.03092001.news (last visited Oct. 20, 2002); see also Estreicher, supra note 1, at
1363-72 (predicting the Supreme Court's narrow reading of the exemption and discussing
the consequences of alternative readings of the exemption).
5. 534 U.S. 279 (2002).
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ruling will have a limited effect on the use of arbitration to adjudicate
disputes involving employee statutory rights.6 This Article addresses
the range of concerns raised by the private adjudication of public
rights and the important remaining question yet unanswered by the
Supreme Court in this area: What standard of review should govern
the courts' scrutiny of arbitration awards in cases involving employee
statutory rights?
Given the Court's holding in Circuit City, which extends the
reach of arbitration under the FAA and Gilmer, arbitration is likely
to become the norm for resolving not only labor and private disputes
under employment contracts, but also employment disputes involving
federal statutory rights.7 This is troubling, because it means that
employees lose the right to have courts adjudicate their rights under
federal employment law. Instead, they are left to press their public
law claims in private, employer promulgated arbitration systems.8
Even though the Court in Gilmer pronounced arbitration an
effective means of adjudicating statutory disputes and arbitration has
a history of effectively resolving a broad range of contractual labor
issues, concerns persist about the fairness and appropriateness of
private adjudication in statutory disputes.9 Unlike federal courts,
6. See id. at nn.2, 7 (noting the minuscule percentage of employment discrimination
lawsuits filed by the EEOC and saying the following: "Surely permitting the EEOC access
to victim-specific relief in cases where the employee has agreed to binding arbitration, but
has not yet brought a claim in arbitration, will have a negligible effect on the federal policy
favoring arbitration").
7. Mei L. Bickner et al., supra note 1 (reporting an increase in the use of arbitration
in nonunion workplaces); Michael H. LeRoy & Peter Feuille, Private Justice in the Shadow
of Public Courts: The Autonomy of Workplace Arbitration Systems, 17 OHIO ST. J. ON
DIsP. RESOL. 19 (2001) (reporting a groundswell of employment arbitration awards
reviewed since 1999).
8. See Alleyne, supra note 1 (comparing employment arbitration forums to labor and
other arbitration forums).
9. See, e.g., Martin H. Malin & Robert F. Ladenson, Privatizing Justice: A
Jurisprudential Perspective on Labor and Employment Arbitration from the Steelworkers
Trilogy to Gilmer, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 1187 (1993). Since the Gilmer decision the lower
courts have been sensitive to questions of fairness in administering employer-promulgated
arbitration systems. See, e.g., Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299 (9th Cir.
1994) (holding that statutory remedies were not knowingly waived where the claimants
were not permitted to read the U-4 form, were told that by signing the form they were
applying to take a test that was necessary for employment, and were not told anything
about arbitration); Nelson v. Cyprus Bagdad Copper Corp., 119 F.3d 756 (9th Cir. 1997)
(holding that arbitration provision in employer's unilaterally promulgated handbook did
not waive a judicial determination of statutory rights); Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173
F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1999) (where the Court refused to enforce the arbitration agreement on
the grounds that its biased procedures constituted a breach).
Also, organizations of suppliers and users of arbitration have instituted reforms
designed to protect the interests of grievants. See, e.g., Self Regulatory Organizations;
whose judges are appointed by the President with the advice and
consent of the Senate,10 arbitrators are selected by one or more of the
parties to the dispute." Arbitrators cannot serve without the parties'
consent, and they depend for their livelihoods upon their
acceptability to the parties." Unlike Article III judges, who are sworn
to uphold the Constitution and laws of the United States, arbitrators
are creatures of contract with no sworn public duty. 3 And while
litigants may gain access to the courts and the services of a federal
judge for a minimal filing fee, parties to an arbitration may be
required to pay substantial arbitrator fees in order to participate in a
hearing and secure a final decision.14 While judicial proceedings must
National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc.; Order Granting Approval to Proposed
Rule Change Relating to the Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Claims, 63 Fed.
Reg. 35299, 35303 (June 22, 1998) (approving proposed rule change effective January 1,
1999, to eliminate mandatory NASD arbitration of statutory employment discrimination
disputes); A Due Process Protocol for Mediation and Arbitration of Statutory Disputes
Arising out of the Employment Relationship, 50 DISP. RESOL. J. 37 (1995), available at
http://www.naarb.org/protocol.html (developed by a task force of twelve representatives
of the labor-management community to provide guarantees of representational rights,
mediator and arbitrator qualifications for membership and requirements for training, a
fair selection procedure, protection against conflicts of interest and a limited scope of
review); Arnold M. Zack, The Evolution of the Employment Protocol, 50 DisP. RESOL. J.
36 (1995); Statement and Guidelines of the National Academy of Arbitrators, available at
http://www.naarb.org/guidelines.html (1997) (stating the NAA's opposition to "mandatory
employment as a condition of employment when it requires waiver of direct access to
either a judicial or administrative forum for the pursuit of statutory rights" and in light of
Gilmer setting forth guidelines for deciding upon case acceptance, pre-hearing
consultation, hearing procedures, and the opinion and award).
10. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
11. FAIRWEATHER'S PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN LABOR ARBITRATION 62-72
(Ray J. Schoonhoven ed., 3d ed. 1990) (exploring selection procedures in labor
arbitration); Alleyne, supra note 1, at 409 (comparing labor and employment arbitration
selection procedures and noting the unilateral selection process in securities industry
arbitration).
12. See Lisa B. Bingham, Employment Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect, 1
EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 189 (1997).
13. Theodore J. St. Antoine, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards: A Second
Look at Enterprise Wheel and Its Progeny, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1137 (1977) (describing the
arbitrator as the parties' contract reader).
14. See Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 89-92 (2000) (where the
Court refused to invalidate an arbitration agreement on the grounds that the prohibitive
expense of arbitration would force the purchaser to forgo her rights under the Truth in
Lending Act, where her failure to produce evidence of such expenses made her claim too
speculative). While the Court in Green Tree acknowledges that arbitration costs "may
well ... preclude a litigant ... from effectively vindicating her federal statutory rights in
the arbitral forum," it could not evaluate the claim in that case because of the absence of
evidence. Id. at 90. On the validity of fee sharing compare Cole v. Burns International
Security Services, 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (holding that the reasonable access to a
neutral forum sanctioned by Gilmer precludes an agreement requiring the employee to
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conform to the Constitution, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
and the Federal Rules of Evidence, which guarantee due process to
litigants, the procedural and evidentiary requirements of arbitration
are much less demanding." Moreover, the factual and legal
determinations of lower courts are fully reviewable by the appellate
and supreme courts, but arbitral decisions are subject to only limited
judicial review. Finally, these pre-dispute arbitration agreements are
seen as involuntary, since typically they must be signed as a condition
of employment. 7
Some suggest that we reverse course and address these concerns
by making pre-dispute employment arbitration agreements
unenforceable. 8 But such a reversal is unlikely, and in any event,
arbitration has certain advantages over litigation that should not be
ignored. Many cite the characteristics of arbitration that distinguish it
from court adjudication as attributes that make it a more attractive
alternative.19 Arbitration is thought to furnish greater access to rights
pay part or all of the fee); Shankle v. B-G Maintenance Management of Colorado Inc., 163
F.3d 1230 (10th Cir. 1999) (concluding that an arbitration agreement was unenforceable
because the requirement that the employee pay one-half the arbitrator's fees made the
arbitral forum inaccessible, undermining the remedial and deterrent functions of the
federal anti-discrimination laws); and Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare
Services, 6 P.3d 669 (Cal. 2000) (agreeing with Cole and holding that the imposition of
substantial forum fees is inconsistent with public policy and that an arbitration agreement
cannot require an employee to bear any type of expense that would not be borne in a
judicial forum). But see Bradford v. Rockwell Semiconductor Sys., Inc., 238 F.3d 549, 556
(4th Cir. 2001) (rejecting Cole's per se rule against fee splitting in favor of a case-by-case
inquiry that considers the "claimant's ability to pay the arbitration fees and costs, the
expected cost differential between arbitration and litigation in court, and whether that cost
differential is so substantial as to deter the bringing of claims"); Williams v. Cigna Fin.
Advisors Inc., 197 F.3d 752 (5th Cir. 1999) (finding that the claimant did not demonstrate
that the requirement that he pay one-half of the forum fees amounting to $3,150
effectively prevented his access to an adequate substitute for a judicial forum).
15. See Schoonhoven, supra note 11, at 117, 231-33, 235-37; ELKOURI & ELKOURI,
How ARBITRATION WORKS 403-10 (Marlin M. Volz & Edward P. Goggin eds., 5th ed.
1997).
16. See 9A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 2585 (2d ed. 1995); infra notes 42-46, 69-85 and accompanying text.
17. See Stone, supra note 1, at 1036 (noting the non-consensual nature of employment
arbitration and arguing that it is tantamount to a yellow dog contract).
18. Three months after the decision in Circuit City, five members of Congress
introduced a bill that would amend the FAA to make pre-dispute arbitration agreements
unenforceable. See Susan J. McGolrick, House Democrats Introduce Legislation to
Overturn High Court's Circuit City Ruling, 119 DAILY LAB. REP., June 21, 2001, at A-3,
available at http://pubs.bna.com (describing the proposed amendment to the FAA as
designed "to make employment arbitration agreements unenforceable unless the
employee and employer both voluntarily consent to arbitrate a claim after it has arisen").
19. See, e.g., STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION-
NEGOTIATION, MEDIATION, AND OTHER PROCESSES 233-37 (3d ed. 1999).
adjudication, because it is less expensive, less formal, and faster than
court adjudication." Also, since an arbitrator's decision (award) is
final, binding and subject to limited judicial review, arbitration has
greater finality than court litigation. Finally, arbitration offers the
advantage of privacy, and in specialized fields the expertise of the
arbitrator as decision-maker can be pivotal.2'
Therefore, we should accept arbitration as a significant part of
how employment disputes will be resolved in the future, but we
should try to preserve the best of both worlds by imposing a serious
judicial review standard. Much of the concern underlying scholarly
and judicial commentary-as well as congressional action-is the fear
that the finality of arbitration permits courts to abdicate the
enforcement responsibility assigned to them by congressional
enactments designed to protect public values in employment
relations.22 While courts retain some oversight of the arbitration
process, they have traditionally exercised a narrow scope of review of
arbitration awards in order to preserve the attributes of speed,
informality, economy, and finality. This narrow scope of review is at
the heart of worries about judicial abdication of enforcement
responsibilities in statutory employment disputes.23 A standard of
review that would preserve arbitration's potential for greater access
to statutory enforcement while assuring the appropriate supervisory
involvement of the courts would lead to a net gain in the protection of
public workplace values.
The purpose of this Article is to propose an approach to judicial
review of arbitration awards that seeks to preserve the best of both
arbitral and judicial treatment of statutory employment issues. This
approach is informed by the history of labor and employment
arbitration, the context of public policy, the positive attributes of
arbitration, the role of courts, and the laboratory experience of the
20. See id.; Harry T. Edwards, Advantages of Arbitration Over Litigation: Reflections
of a Judge, in ARBITRATION 1982 CONDUCT OF THE HEARING: PROCEEDINGS OF THE
THIRTY-FIFTH ANNUAL MEETING NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 16 (James
L. Stern & Barbara D. Dennis eds., 1983); Lewis L. Maltby, Private Justice: Employment
Arbitration and Civil Rights, 30 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 29, 45 (1998) (arguing based
on empirical evidence that employees have greater access to justice and better outcomes
in arbitration than in litigation).
21. See GOLDBERG, supra note 19.
22. See infra notes 49-52 and accompanying text. See, e.g., Cole, 105 F.3d 1465;
Alleyne, supra note 1; Malin & Ladenson, supra note 9; Maltby, supra note 20, at 41-42
(characterizing limited appeal rights as making employees arguably worse off in
arbitration than in litigation); Norman S. Poser, Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards:
Manifest Disregard of the Law, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 471 (1998); Stone, supra note 1.
23. See authorities cited supra note 22.
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new arbitration system in South Africa. It promises a system that
makes both arbitrators and courts more accountable to the public
policy requirements of employment statutes and promotes greater
access to the enforcement of worker rights under such statutes.
Part I of the Article will discuss the history of arbitration against
the backdrop of the Alternative Dispute Resolution ("ADR")
movement with an emphasis on public policy cases. Part II will focus
specifically on judicial review, closely examining the standards of
review problem in employment cases. Part II will also propose a
substantive integrity standard of review and demonstrate its
application. Part III will discuss the laboratory results of the South
African experiment, which support the current proposal for reviewing
arbitration awards in statutory employment cases. The Article will
conclude that the substantive integrity standard of review may offer
employees the best access to enforcement of important statutory
rights.
I. The Tension Between Arbitration and Public Policy
A. Arbitration and Public Policy
(1) Labor Arbitration as a Model
Arbitration is a primary alternative dispute resolution ("ADR")
process that takes the final outcome of the dispute out of the hands of
the parties.24 It is softer on the parties' relationship than litigation,
and it gives them a measure of control over the process that they
cannot exercise in litigation.25 Early in the history of collective
bargaining, representatives of management and organized labor
recognized the cost, efficiency, finality, informality, and privacy
advantages of arbitration over litigation in settling contractual
disputes.26 Labor arbitration was a salutary process that offered an
24. GOLDBERG, supra note 19, at 3-13 (giving a brief history of the ADR movement
and comparing the fundamental ADR processes).
25. See Benjamin Aaron, Labor Arbitration and Its Critics, 10 LAB. L.J. 605, 607
(1959) (referring to party control over the process).
26. See Dennis R. Nolan & Roger I. Abrams, American Labor Arbitration: The
Maturing Years, 35 U. FLA. L. REV. 557, 623-24 (1983) (describing the changes in
arbitration during and after World War II). See generally R.W. Fleming, The Labor
Arbitration Process: 1943-1963, 52 KY. L.J. 817 (1964); SUMNER H. SLICHTER, JAMES J.
HEALY & E. ROBERT LIVERNASH, THE IMPACT OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ON
MANAGEMENT 804-06 (1960).
expert factfinder who controlled the process. It also minimized
casualties by presenting a peaceful alternative to economic warfare.27
The United States Supreme Court recognized the benefits of
arbitration in labor disputes in the Steelworkers Trilogy-three cases
involving the same labor union decided on the same day in 1960.21
The Trilogy announced as national labor policy the preeminence of
arbitration as the means of settling disputes arising under collective
agreements between employers and unions. Under this policy, courts
are not to decide a contractual dispute or examine the merits of an
arbitration decision, even if the courts are convinced that the case can
be decided in only one way and that the arbitrator's award is wrong.29
This strong pro-arbitration policy requires the contracting parties to
clearly indicate their choice of some dispute resolution process other
than arbitration if they want the courts to honor this preference."
The scope of review of an arbitration award under the Trilogy is
very narrow. In United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel
& Car Corp., the Supreme Court reversed the Fourth Circuit's refusal
to enforce an arbitration award based on its disagreement with the
arbitrator's remedial order.3' Concerned about the finality of
arbitration awards, the Supreme Court said that "the refusal of courts
to review the merits of an arbitration award is the proper approach to
arbitration under collective bargaining agreements.
3 2
However, freedom of contract notions constrained this pro-
arbitration posture. In Enterprise Wheel, the Court also stated that
the arbitrator "does not sit to dispense his own brand of industrial
justice' and that "the award is legitimate only so long as it draws its
27. See United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582
(1960) (noting that parties' primary objective in using arbitration is to "further their
common goal of uninterrupted production under the agreement, to make the agreement
serve their specialized needs").
28. United Steelworkers v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); Warrior & Gulf, 363
U.S. 574; United Steelworkers v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
29. Am. Mfg., 363 U.S. at 568.
30. See Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S. at 584-85; AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Communications
Workers, 475 U.S. 643, 647 (1986) (reiterating the Warrior & Gulf holding and making it
clear that the question of substantive arbitrability is to be decided by the courts unless the
parties expressly provide otherwise); Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 123 S. Ct.
588, 592-93 (2002) (holding that the procedural arbitrability challenge of the investment
firm under the NASD Code of Arbitration Procedure was appropriately decided by the
arbitrator and reiterating the presumption that substantive arbitrability questions are
decided by the court).
31. 363 U.S. 593, 597-98 (1960); see also St. Antoine, supra note 13.
32. Enterprise Wheel, 363 U.S. at 596.
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essence from the collective bargaining agreement."33 Additionally,
conscious of the need for procedural fairness in the administration of
arbitrations, the courts will not condone an arbitrator's bias, fraud,
corruption, misconduct, or exceeding contractually defined powers."
Where this kind of misconduct can be shown, the parties are deprived
of the legitimate and well-defined arbitration process for which they
negotiated and courts will vacate resulting awards. However, when
the arbitrator is faithful to the obligation to interpret the contract
within the limitations contained in its provisions, the award cannot be
set aside simply because the court disagrees with the arbitrator on the
merits. This narrow scope of review advances the cause of finality in
the settlement of labor disputes by preventing the loser in arbitration
from successfully seeking recourse in the courts.
(2) Concerns About Public Policy
This system has worked well. Virtually every labor contract has
an arbitration provision for resolving disputes that the parties are
unable to settle,35 and ADR generally has gained wide acceptance.36
But even as the ADR movement has exploded, its praises have not
been sung by a universal chorus. Perhaps the most influential
discordant voice has been Yale Law Professor Owen Fiss.
Professor Fiss argued in a 1984 Yale Law Journal article that
settlement in lieu of litigation is inappropriate in the majority of cases
for four reasons.37 First, the terms of a settlement may reflect the
disparity in resources between the stronger and weaker party rather
than the predicted outcome at trial. 8 Second, since many cases
33. Id. at 597.
34. See 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (2000); see also United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco,
Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 40 n.9 (1987) (noting that federal courts have often looked to the FAA
for guidance in labor arbitration cases in light of section 301 empowering federal courts to
fashion a common law remedy enforcing the collective-bargaining agreement); Margetta v.
Pam Pam Corp., 501 F.2d 179, 180 (9th Cir. 1974) (referring to the restrictive rule for
reviewing arbitration awards and noting fraud as an exception to that rule); St. Antoine,
supra note 13, at 1144-46.
35. AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION 1999 ANNUAL REPORT 12, available at
http://www.adr.org/upload/LIVESITE/About/annual-reports/000525ab.pdf.
36. See GOLDBERG, supra note 19, at 6-9 (noting the evolution of ADR from
experimentation to institutionalization).
37. Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984).
38. Id. at 1076; see also IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW:
REFORMATION, NATIONALIZATION, INTERNATIONALIZATION 5 (1992), saying the
following:
These so-called alternative methods are generally vastly more efficient and
effective than are State dispute resolution processes. As to the justice of their
outcomes, they are extensions of the nondispute relations of the participants.
involve representatives speaking on behalf of others, the agreement
may reflect the interests of the representatives rather than the
clients.39 Third, courts are better suited than a settlement mechanism
to supervise continuing public policy disputes that may arise during
the remedial phase of a case." Fourth, there may be a need for justice
rather than peace.4" Judges are public officials using public resources
under the authority of public law, accordingly:
Their job is not to maximize the ends of private parties, nor simply
to secure the peace, but to explicate and give force to the values
embodied in authoritative texts such as the Constitution and
statutes: to interpret those values and to bring reality into accord
with them. This duty is not discharged when the parties settle.
One way to appreciate this argument is to consider whether
public policy would have been better served by having Brown v.
Board of Education3 decided by a court or settled privately by the
parties. Brown, of course, removed the legal basis for racial
segregation by striking down the "separate but equal" doctrine and
introduced an era of broad scale social reform in the United States."
Fiss's observations on the problems associated with settlement
raise two important issues relating to statutory employment
arbitration under the FAA. First, Fiss describes the aforementioned
drawbacks of settlement efforts voluntarily entered into by the parties
as an alternative to court litigation." Such efforts occur where the
parties have information about the nature of the dispute and a
present, post-dispute, choice about the most effective forum." The
element of volition creates less cause for concern about the final
outcomes of settlement efforts than when a party is deprived of such a
choice, as in a pre-dispute employment agreement.47 Mandatory
arbitration under pre-dispute agreements sanctioned by Gilmer may
compound Fiss's concerns about the untoward impact of settlement,
They thus tend to yield justice more or less commensurate with the justice of the
relations themselves.
39. Fiss, supra note 37, at 1078.
40. Id. at 1082.
41. Id. at 1085.
42. Id.
43. 349 U.S. 294 (1954).
44. Id. at 298.
45. See Fiss, supra note 37, at 1075 (discussing the prototypical settlement as a
consensual accommodation between neighbors that is preferable to a judgment).
46. See, e.g., Kevin C. McMunigal, The Cost of Settlement: The Impact of Scarcity of
Adjudication on Litigating Lawyers, 37 UCLA L. REv. 833, 844-47 (exploring the
competing views in the debate about settlement).
47. See infra notes 73-79 and accompanying text.
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since they may exacerbate the problem of unevenness and undermine
the ends of justice.48
Second, even if the arbitration is voluntary, Professor Fiss's
arguments raise the question of whether arbitrators should decide
public policy issues. Despite the advantages noted earlier,
arbitration, like all human institutions, is imperfect. For example,
given the selection procedures that are available, arbitration does not
guarantee a competent arbitrator.49 In addition, finality may disserve
the parties since the losing party may have no recourse against an
erroneous decision and the arbitrator may have less incentive to do
her best in the absence of the threat of judicial review." Informality is
a "two-edged sword," since it may simply translate into a poorly
administered hearing featuring extraneous materials. 1 Furthermore,
informality ceases to be a benefit where one or more parties are
poorly represented, where the arbitrator lacks expertise, or where fair
and adequate procedures do not properly protect private or public
interests. The loss of discovery procedures, which presents a
particular challenge in the digital age, 2 is an example of how the
informality of arbitration may lead to less protection of public or
48. See supra notes 38-43 and accompanying text regarding Fiss's first and fourth
arguments. This is true of arbitration agreements under section 2 of the FAA. These
contracts are typically executed at the time of hire. Under these circumstances the
unconsenting employee's only choice is to forego the job. See Alleyne, supra note 1, at
420 (describing the unilateral characteristics of employment arbitration); Stone, supra note
1 (likening the Gilmer arbitration to a yellow dog contract). The newly hired employee
stands to lose important statutory protections under the employer's unilaterally
promulgated arbitration system. See, e.g., Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933
(4th Cir. 1999) (holding that the employer's one-sided arbitration rules so undermined the
neutrality of the proceeding as to constitute a breach of the arbitration agreement).
49. See Edward Brunet, Questioning The Quality of Alternate Dispute Resolution, 62
TUL. L. REV. 1, 24 (1987) (comparing the imprimatur of competency that judges have
based on a public examination of competence to the absence of such a process for
arbitrators).
50. See ROBERT J. MARTINEAU, MODERN APPELLATE PRACTICE-FEDERAL AND
STATE CIVIL APPEALS § 1.8 (1983) (noting that appellate review can serve as "error
prevention" in preventing judges from consciously committing reversible error and
causing them to "exercise greater caution to prevent unintentional error").
51. See Robert Coulson, Away from Informality, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 1, 1992, at 3
(describing arbitration's trend toward greater formality with the use of transcripts, post-
hearing briefs, and expert witnesses).
52. See Jamie Roberson, Lawyers Urged to Keep Up with Technology to Provide Best
Assistance to Their Clients, 1 DAILY LAB. REP., July 25, 2001, at C-i, available at
http://pubs.bna.com.
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private interests. 53 This Article advances the view that effective
judicial review is one way of allaying these concerns.
B. Collective Bargaining Cases Involving Public Law and Policy
In labor arbitration cases, the law has been skeptical about
arbitration's suitability to resolve matters of public law and policy. In
a 1974 case, Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., the United States
Supreme Court expressed the skepticism generated by the potential
defects in arbitration by holding that an employee was entitled to a
full trial in federal court on his claim that his discharge was motivated
by race discrimination, even though an arbitrator under a collective
bargaining agreement had found that the employer discharged him
because of poor performance. In the Court's view, the employee's
earlier resort to arbitration had not constituted a waiver of judicial
relief, the employee was not required to elect between contractual
and judicial remedies, and the employee's federal claim was not
subject to a deferral rule.55 The Court also cited a number of factors
making arbitration inferior to the judicial process for resolving
statutory disputes, noting particularly that the arbitrator's
competence was limited to the norms of industrial relations-the law
of the shop. 6  Contrasting this limited competence with the
requirements of statutory interpretation, the Court declared:
On the other hand, the resolution of statutory or constitutional
issues is a primary responsibility of courts, and judicial construction
has proved especially necessary with respect to Title VII, whose
broad language frequently can be given meaning only by reference
to public law concepts. 7
53. See Due Process Protocol, supra note 9, § B.3 (acknowledging that "[o]ne of the
advantages of arbitration is that there is usually less time and money spent in pre-trial
discovery" and calling for "[a]dequate but limited pre-trial discovery" giving claimants
"access to all information reasonably relevant to mediation and/or arbitration of their
claims"); Michael Hunter Schwartz, From Star to Supernova to Dark, Cold Neutron Star:
The Early Life, the Explosion and the Collapse of Arbitration, 22 W. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 13-
14 (1994) (discussing the process flaws including the dearth of discovery in arbitration);
Brunet, supra note 49, at 30 (comparing the prodiscovery tone of judicial discovery with
the "antidiscovery spirit" of arbitration); cf. Teresa Snider, The Discovery Powers of
Arbitrators and Federal Courts Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 34 TORT & INS. L.J. 101,
114 (1998) (extolling the broad discovery powers of arbitrators even over nonparties).
54. 415 U.S. 36, 59-60 (1974).
55. Id. at 51-57. The Court said: "In sum, Title VII's purpose and procedures strongly
suggest that an individual does not forfeit his private cause of action if he first pursues his
grievance to final arbitration under the nondiscrimination clause of a collective-bargaining
agreement." Id. at 49.
56. Id. at 56-57.
57. Id. at 57.
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Not stopping there, the Alexander Court elaborated as follows:
Moreover, the factfinding process in arbitration usually is not
equivalent to judicial factfinding. The record of the arbitration
proceedings is not as complete; the usual rules of evidence do not
apply; and rights and procedures common to civil trials, such as
discovery, compulsory process, cross-examination, and testimony
under oath, are often severely limited or unavailable.... And as
this Court has recognized, "[a]rbitrators have no obligation to the
court to give their reasons for an award." ... Indeed, it is the
informality of arbitral procedure that enables it to function as an
efficient, inexpensive, and expeditious means for dispute resolution.
This same characteristic, however, makes arbitration a less
appropriate forum for final resolution of Title VII issues than the
federal courts."
However, even in Alexander the Court recognized a place for
arbitration in Title VII cases by permitting courts to give arbitration
awards their appropriate weight. 9
Public policy considerations also crept into judicial review of
awards involving the law of the shop. In W.R. Grace & Co. v. Rubber
Workers Local 759, decided in 1983, the Court expanded the narrow
scope of judicial review of arbitration awards under Enterprise Wheel
to include an examination of whether the award violated public
policy.6° However, even in public policy-based review, the Court
announced a standard that balanced the need to preserve the
autonomy of arbitration against the demands of public policy. In
W.R. Grace, the Court recognized its special function of protecting
the interest of a public that is not represented in private collective
bargaining, even if the arbitrator does not exceed her authority under
the agreement. 61 It announced that "a court may not enforce a
collective-bargaining agreement that is contrary to public policy.
62
But by articulating the following standard the Court was careful to
control judicial overreaching under the guise of deciding questions of
public policy:
58. Id. at 57-58 (quoting United Steelworkers v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S.
593, 598 (1960)).
59. Id. at 60 n.21; see also Collins v. New York City Transit Authority, 305 F.3d 113,
119 (2nd Cir. 2002) (affirming a district court's granting of summary judgment against an
employee, finding that a reasoned decision, based on substantial evidence by an
independent, neutral, and unbiased arbitration board furnished additional probative
evidence of a legitimate business reason for the employee's discharge and heightened the
plaintiff's burden of proving a causal link between his discharge and a retaliatory or
discriminatory motive).
60. W.R. Grace & Co. v. Rubber Workers Local 759, 461 U.S. 757 (1983).
61. See United Paperworkers v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 42 (1987).
62. Id.
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[T]he question of public policy is ultimately one for resolution by
the courts.... Such a public policy, however, must be well defined
and dominant, and is to be ascertained "by reference to the laws
and legal precedents and not from general considerations of
supposed public interests.,
63
Under this difficult standard, the company in W.R. Grace was
unsuccessful in attempting to have the award set aside on public
policy grounds.'
The Court has resisted efforts to broaden the scope of judicial
review most recently in Eastern Associated Coal Corp. v. United Mine
Workers of America, District 17.5 In Eastern Coal, the Court cabined
public policy review by limiting it to the question of whether the
award (rather than the employee's conduct) violated public policy.
66
In collective bargaining cases, the Enterprise Wheel and W.R.
Grace/Misco/Eastern Coal decisions combine to place two general
issues before the reviewing court faced with suits to vacate arbitration
awards: (1) Is the award within the arbitrator's authority under the
agreement? and (2) Does it violate public policy? 6 Only a violation
of one of these narrow standards will lead to vacatur of the award on
the merits.
63. W.R. Grace, 461 U.S. at 766 (citing Muschany v. United States, 324 U.S. 49, 66
(1945)).
64. Id. at 771-72.
65. 531 U.S. 57 (2000); see also Misco, 484 U.S. at 43 (where the Court rejected a
broad power to set aside arbitration awards, saying that an explicit conflict with "laws and
legal precedents" rather than an assessment of "general consideration of supposed public
interest" was required (quoting W.R. Grace, 461 U.S. at 766)).
66. Id. at 63. The Court in Eastern Coal addressed the positive law issue specifically
left open by the Misco court. In this case, where an award reinstated a truck driver who
had twice tested positive for marijuana, the Court distinguished two questions: (1)
whether the employee's drug use violated public policy and (2) whether the award
reinstating him did so. Id. at 62-63. Only the latter question is relevant under the public
policy standard of review. Id. at 63. While leaving open the possibility "in principle" that
the public policy exception is not limited to whether the award violates positive law, the
Court said that the district court "correctly articulated the standard set out in W.R. Grace
and Misco" when it asked whether the award violated positive law. Id. Moreover, the
Court scrutinized the award in light of Department of Transportation regulations and
found none of them violated by the award. Id. at 65-66. Eastern Coal makes clear that
refusals to enforce arbitration awards based on public policy will be quite rare.
67. See generally Stephen L. Hayford & Anthony V. Sinicropi, The Labor Contract
and External Law: Revisiting the Arbitrator's Scope of Authority, 2 J. DISP. RESOL. 249
(1993).
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C. The Emergence of Employment Arbitration Under the FAA
Until 1991, virtually all employee-employer disputes resolved by
arbitration occurred in the context of collective bargaining."
Arbitration provisions contained in collective bargaining agreements
were enforceable under section 301 of the Labor Management
Relations Act. 9  That section embodied not only the courts'
jurisdiction over enforcement actions, but also spawned the common
law of collective bargaining agreements as reflected in the Trilogy and
other cases.70
Although commercial arbitration, sanctioned under the FAA,
has coexisted on a parallel track with labor arbitration, commercial
disputes settled in arbitration typically involved business relationships
other than employment.7" The two fields of commercial and labor
arbitration converged in the frequently-discussed 1991 Supreme
Court decision, Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., which
addressed the arbitration of an employee's public law claim.72
In Gilmer, the Supreme Court held enforceable under the FAA
an agreement to arbitrate "[a]ny controversy... arising out of
68. See David Lewin, Grievance Procedures in Nonunion Workplaces: An Empirical
Analysis of Usage, Dynamics, and Outcomes, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 823 (1990) (reporting
empirical evidence suggesting a substantial incidence of grievance procedures but a low
percentage of arbitration in the nonunion sector).
69. Section 301 of the LMRA states in part:
(a) Venue, amount, and citizenship
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor
organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as
defined in this chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be
brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the
parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to
the citizenship of the parties.
29 U.S.C. § 185 (2000).
70. See Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957) (holding that section 301
authorized federal courts to fashion a common law of the collective bargaining agreement
which includes the specific enforcement of arbitration agreements); see also cases cited
supra note 28.
71. See, e.g., Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477
(1989) (customers' action against broker under Securities Act of 1933);
Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987) (customers' suit
against brokerage firm under Securities Act of 1934 and RICO); Mitsubishi Motors Corp.
v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985) (car dealer's counterclaim against a
car manufacturer under the Sherman Act); Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953) (customer
action against partners in a securities firm under the Securities Act of 1933); see also
MACNEIL, supra note 38, at 57-58 (espousing the view that Justice Whittaker's attempt to
have the Court treat labor and commercial arbitration interchangeably in his dissent in
Warrior & Gulf hastened the demise of commercial arbitration's unfavorable treatment in
the courts).
72. 500 U.S. 20 (1991); see sources cited supra note 1.
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employment or termination of employment."73 The agreement was an
individual agreement rather than a collective bargaining agreement,
and the employee claimed that his discharge constituted age
discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act.74 Importantly, the Court in Gilmer made it clear that the
enforcement of agreements to arbitrate statutory claims was a waiver
of the judicial forum only and not of the substantive rights conferred
by statutes.75
Regarding the discussion in Alexander about the competency of
arbitration to handle such statutory issues, the Court distinguished
the two cases on the grounds that unlike Gilmer, Alexander did not
involve an agreement to arbitrate statutory claims.76 And to the
suggestion in Alexander that arbitration is inferior to the judicial
process for resolving statutory disputes, the Court responded by
quoting one of its earlier post-Alexander decisions discrediting the
notion of arbitral inferiority: "We are well past the time when
judicial suspicion of the desirability of arbitration and of the
competence of arbitral tribunals inhibited the development of
arbitration as an alternative means of dispute resolution."77
73. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 23. Section 1 of the FAA excludes from the coverage of the
Act: "contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of
workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce." 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2000). The Court in
Gilmer was able to avoid this issue by finding that the U-4 registration form that bound
the employee to arbitration was not an employment contract. 500 U.S. at 40. In Circuit
City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001), the Supreme Court narrowly interpreted
this exemption to permit coverage of most American workers.
74. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 23-24.
75. Id. at 26.
76. In distinguishing Alexander from Gilmer the Court said the following:
There are several important distinctions between the Gardner-Denver line of
cases and the case before us. First, those cases did not involve the issue of the
enforceability of an agreement to arbitrate statutory claims. Rather, they
involved the quite different issue whether arbitration of contract-based claims
precluded subsequent judicial resolution of statutory claims. Since the
employees there had not agreed to arbitrate their statutory claims, and the labor
arbitrators were not authorized to resolve such claims, the arbitration in those
cases understandably was held not to preclude subsequent statutory actions.
Second, because the arbitration in those cases occurred in the context of a
collective bargaining agreement, the claimants there were represented by their
unions in the arbitration proceedings. An important concern therefore was the
tension between collective representation and individual statutory rights, a
concern not applicable to the present case. Finally, those cases were not decided
under the FAA, which, as discussed above, reflects a "liberal federal policy
favoring arbitration agreements." Therefore, those cases provide no basis for
refusing to enforce Gilmer's agreement to arbitrate his ADEA claim.
500 U.S. at 35 (quoting Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 625).
77. Id. at 34 n.5 (quoting Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 626-27).
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Petitioner Gilmer also raised the issue that is the central focus of
this Article. He argued that judicial review of arbitration decisions is
too limited to permit arbitrators to decide statutory issues.78 The
Court rejected this claim, again quoting from an earlier decision:
"We have stated ... that 'although judicial scrutiny of arbitration
awards necessarily is limited, such review is sufficient to ensure that





This statement reveals the Gilmer Court's contemplation of
judicial review sufficient to protect statutory rights-namely that
courts ensure arbitral compliance with statutory requirements. Part
II addresses the problem of judicial review in employment
arbitration.
II. Judicial Review
A. Civil Standards of Review
As Table I, infra, illustrates, civil standards of review vary
depending upon the tribunal and judicial function being evaluated in
the federal system.8" The most restrictive standard, represented by
the tallest bar, is the labor arbitration standard developed under the
Trilogy. Under that standard, as already noted, an award may not be
set aside, no matter how clearly erroneous its factual and legal
determinations, unless it fails to draw its essence from the collective
bargaining agreement or violates a clearly defined public policy.
81
Next in degree of restrictiveness is the "sufficient evidence" standard
of review applied to jury verdicts. In jury cases, appellate courts must
view the evidence in a light most favorable to the appellee, assume
78. Id. at 31 n.4.
79. Id. (quoting Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 232
(1987).
80. Generally, in criminal cases the double jeopardy clause and the constitutional right
to a jury trial make review of acquittals unavailable to prosecutors; however criminal
defendants may challenge convictions through direct attacks on convictions, collateral
attacks on convictions, and trial motions. The general standard of review for direct and
collateral attacks is whether there was sufficient evidence at trial to convince a reasonable
factfinder of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt considered in a light most favorable to the
prosecution. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979); Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277
(1992) ("This familiar standard gives full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact fairly
to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable
inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.").
A motion to acquit must be granted if a reasonable mind must conclude based on all
of the evidence that a reasonable doubt existed. See United States v. Mariani, 725 F.2d
862, 866 (2d Cir. 1984). See generally STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG & DANIEL J. CAPRA,
AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 1487-93 (6th ed. 2000).
81. See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
that all conflicts were resolved in favor of the appellee, and draw all
inferences in favor of the appellee.' Only when the evidence cannot
reasonably support a jury finding can the trial court or an appellate
court set aside a verdict.83 The third most restrictive standard is the
"substantial evidence" standard that is applied to administrative
agency fact-finding.' This standard requires more than some support
in the record; it mandates substantial support in light of the record as
a whole-the parts that both support and detract from the finding.85
However, the standard respects agency choice between "fairly
conflicting views even though the court would justifiably have made a
different choice had the matter been before it de novo."86 Fourth is
the "clearly erroneous" standard for reviewing nonjury district court
factual findings." Under this standard the district judge is not favored
with the presumptions enjoyed by the jury. Rather, as articulated by
the Supreme Court in United States v. United States Gypsum Co.: "A
finding is 'clearly erroneous' when although there is evidence to
support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed."'
The "substantial evidence" and "clearly erroneous" standards
are quite close, however, unlike the "substantial evidence" standard,
the "clearly erroneous" standard seems to permit reversal based upon
the reviewing court's disagreement with the trial court on the merits.89
82. See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 16, § 2585.
83. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a) (providing for a directed verdict and judgment
notwithstanding the verdict where "no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable
jury [finding]" exists; see also Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 389 (1943)
(rejecting an argument that a directed verdict violated the Seventh Amendment right to a
jury trial saying that "the contention has been foreclosed by repeated decisions made here
consistently for nearly a century").
84. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (2000).
85. See Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951), and FCC v.
Allentown Broad. Corp., 349 U.S. 358, 360 (1955) (both noting the importance of trial
examiner findings when evaluating agency findings).
86. See Universal Camera, 340 U.S. at 488.
87. Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a) provides in part:
In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an advisory jury, the
court shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law
thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule 58 .... Findings of
fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside
unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the
trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.
FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a). See generally WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 16, § 2585.
88. 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948).
89. But see WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 16, § 2585 (footnote omitted), equating the
"substantial evidence" and "clearly erroneous" standards as follows:
The appellate court, in reviewing findings, does not consider and weigh the
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Each of these four standards recognizes the superior position of
the initial decision-maker to pass upon questions that may turn on the
dynamics of the hearing or, in the case of the arbitrator, the parties'
contractual relationship.' By giving preeminence to that decision-
maker, these four standards facilitate administrative efficiency, instill
in the litigants confidence in the fact-finding process, and contain the
costs and delays associated with appeals.9'
On the other hand, the more expansive standards of review
recognize the appellate court's equal competence to consider
questions of law and of mixed law and fact. Where the correctness of
legal interpretation or application-rather than factfinding-is at
issue, the initial decision-maker has no advantage over the reviewing
court. The second most expansive standard comes from
administrative law and is sometimes characterized as the "hard look"
standard.92 Because Congress often charges agencies, under the
watchful eyes of appellate courts, with interpreting statutes and
making policy, the relationship between courts and agencies has been
described as follows: "The process thus combines judicial supervision
with a salutary principle of judicial restraint, an awareness that
agencies and courts together constitute a 'partnership' in furtherance
of the public interest, and are 'collaborative instrumentalities of
justice. '
For this reason, if the agency has engaged in reasoned decision-
making, the court will not set aside an agency action, even if the court
evidence de novo. The mere fact that on the same evidence the appellate court
might have reached a different result does not justify it in setting the district
court's findings aside' It may regard a finding as clearly erroneous only if the
finding is without adequate evidentiary support or induced by an erroneous view
of the law. Insofar as a finding is derived from the application of an improper
legal standard to the facts, it cannot be allowed to stand.
If a finding is not supported by substantial evidence, it will be found to be clearly
erroneous.
90. See id. § 2586; JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 621 (3d ed.
1999) (making the point that the restriction of fact determination review giving greater
deference to the factfinder is necessary, "[s]ince the entire trial cannot be recreated on
appeal").
91. See Lyons v. Board of Educ., 523 F.2d 340, 347-48 (8th Cir. 1975) (expounding
upon the reasons for permitting the trial court to resolve factual issues). See generally
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 16, § 2585.
92. See Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 850-53 (D.C. Cir.
1970).
93. Id. at 851-52 (citing United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 422, (1941)).
would have made different findings or promulgated different
standards.94
The most expansive standard is "de novo" review. Under this
standard the reviewing courts set aside erroneous interpretations or
applications of the law.95 Reflecting the difficulties involved in
characterizing issues upon review as factual, legal, or mixed, the




(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
"Essence/ "Sufficient "Substantial "Clearly "Hard Look" "De Novo"
Public Policy" Evidence" Evidence" Erroneous" APA T.Ct. Law/ Mixed
LaborArbitration Civil Juries Administrative T.Ct. Law Law and Fact
Law and Fact Fact Agency Fact
Fact
This bar graph depicts the degrees of restrictiveness of standards of
review as a function of the showing required to set aside the findings
of lower tribunals. The shorter the bar the less stringent the required
showing.
94. Id. See also Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 865 (1.984) (deferring to the EPA's plantwide interpretation of the term "stationary
source," because it "represent[ed] a reasonable accommodation of manifestly competing
interests.., the agency considered the matter in a detailed and reasoned fashion, and the
decision involves reconciling conflicting policies").
95. Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 52(a) provides that "[f]indings of fact.., shall not be set aside
unless clearly erroneous .... See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 16, § 2585 (stating that:
"The appellate court, in reviewing findings, does not consider and weigh the evidence de
novo .... The mere fact that on the same evidence the appellate court might have
reached a different result does not justify it in setting the district court's findings aside.");
see also id. at § 2588, asserting that:
Rule 52(a) describes the very narrow appellate review that may be given to
findings of fact. It is silent about legal conclusions. This silence has been
correctly interpreted as meaning that the 'clearly erroneous' restriction is not
applicable and that the trial court's rulings on questions of law are reviewable
without any comparable limitation.
96. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 16, §§ 2588-91.
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B. Standards of Review in Employment Arbitration
The court in Gilmer strongly endorsed the use of arbitration to
deal with statutory issues by stating that a party agreeing to
arbitration does not forgo substantive statutory rights. 7 Gilmer also
affirmed the adequacy of judicial review, but it did not directly
address the posture that courts should take in reviewing arbitration
awards.98 What standard of review would assure statutory protection?
Should courts be restrained in setting aside an award as long as the
arbitrator engaged in no misconduct, such as bias or the denial of a
party's full opportunity to present its case (a narrow scope of
review)? Or should courts be free to set aside awards where the
arbitration decision is simply wrong, even though the arbitrator
engaged in no misconduct (a broad standard)? Should the standard
vary depending upon the characteristics of the case?99
The need to preserve the positive attributes of arbitration-such
as speed, informality, economy, and finality-suggest a narrow scope
of review. Challenges to arbitration awards in judicial proceedings
give courts, rather than arbitrators, the last word by allowing courts to
change the arbitral outcome. They also formalize and prolong the
settlement process and entail additional expense to achieve a final
resolution. Moreover, even though the actual reversal rate might be
quite low under a broad review standard, the perceived opportunity
for judicial relief may motivate the parties to seek review in marginal
cases and commensurately escalate their costs. These additional
transaction costs add to the expense of doing business and to the
burden of rights enforcement.
On the other hand, justice, fairness, and protecting public policy
as embodied in public laws would seem to call for a broader standard
allowing courts to review the merits of awards. The Constitution,
statutes, and the common law embody the values of procedural and
substantive justice and fairness, and the rights reflecting these values
are applicable to the entire polity. The courts, as political institutions
established to protect the public interest, have a special responsibility
97. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26, 28 (1991).
98. See Halligan v. Piper Jaffray, Inc., 148 F.3d 197, 202-03 (2d Cir. 1998); Cole v.
Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1486-87 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (arguing that the non-
waiver of substantive rights discussion in Gilmer condoned judicial review of the merits of
arbitration); see also infra notes 146-59 and accompanying text.
99. See Stephen L. Hayford, Unification of the Law of Labor Arbitration and
Commercial Arbitration: An Idea Whose Time Has Come, 52 BAYLOR L. REV. 781 (2000)
(advocating a unified contractual approach to vacatur standards in both labor and
employment arbitration).
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to adjudicate disputes involving public rights. This responsibility
should not be abdicated to private institutions, whose allegiances run
to their sponsors rather than the public."' Even though private
tribunals may appropriately hear cases involving public policy issues
in the first instance, the courts must monitor in a supervisory capacity
the substantive quality of such proceedings.
(1) Commercial Arbitration
In commercial arbitration cases, which may involve employer to
employee as well as business to business and business to consumer
disputes, 1 section 10(a) of the FAA sets forth the following four
narrow statutory grounds for vacating an award:
(a) In any of the following cases the United States court in and for
the district wherein the award was made may make an order
vacating the award upon the application of any party to the
arbitration-
(1) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or
undue means.
(2) Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the
arbitrators, or either of them.
(3) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing
to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in
refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the
controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of
any party have been prejudiced.
(4) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so
imperfectly executed them- that a mutual, final, and definite
award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.0 2
In addition, all twelve federal circuit courts of appeals, but not
the Federal Circuit, have cited the following six non-statutory
grounds for vacating arbitration awards: "manifest disregard,"'0 °
100. See Fiss, supra note 37, at 1075.
101. See generally Stephen Hayford & Ralph Peeples, Commercial Arbitration in
Evolution: An Assessment and Call for Dialogue, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 343
(1995).
102. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2000); see also Eric Lucentini, Taking a Fresh Look at Vacatur of
Awards Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 7 AM. REV. INT'L. ARB. 359, 370 (1996)
(observing that the parties "are often tempted to shoehorn themselves artificially within
the ambit of the statute" by asserting a ground such as "evident partiality," when they are
really dissatisfied with an arbitrator's decision on the merits).
103. See, e.g., Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953), overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v.
Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989); First Options v. Kaplan, 514 U.S.
938 (1995); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bobker, 808 F.2d 930 (2d Cir.
1986); San Martine Compania de Navegacion v. Saguenay Terminals Ltd., 293 F.2d 796
(9th Cir. 1961).
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"public policy,"1 4 "arbitrary and capricious award,' "'0 "completely
irrational award,"' '° "essence of the agreement,"'" and "mistake of
fact."10 8  Of the six nonstatutory grounds "manifest disregard" is
mentioned most frequently, and the three cases setting aside statutory
arbitration awards have applied the "manifest disregard" standard."
a. The "Manifest Disregard" Standard
The Supreme Court has announced neither the applicability of
the "manifest disregard" standard nor the meaning of the standard as
it might be applied to the review of awards in employment cases
involving statutory disputes. The Court made its first reference to the
standard in Wilko v. Swan1 °, a case decided thirty-eight years before
Gilmer. Wilko involved a dispute between a client and the partners in
a brokerage firm about misrepresentations in connection with the sale
of stock."' The court of appeals had reversed the district court's
finding that the arbitration clause in the parties' margin agreement
104. See, e.g., Ariz. Elec. Power Coop., Inc. v. Berkeley, 59 F.3d 988 (9th Cir. 1995);
Brown v. Rauscher Pierce Refsnes, Inc., 994 F.2d 775 (11th Cir. 1993); Seymour v. Blue
Cross/Blue Shield, 988 F.2d 1020 (10th Cir. 1993); Revere Copper & Brass, Inc. v.
Overseas Private Inv. Corp., 628 F.2d 81 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Diapulse Corp. of Am. v. Carba,
Ltd., 626 F.2d 1108 (2d Cir. 1980).
105. See, e.g., Rauscher, 994 F.2d 775; Ainsworth v. Skurnick, 960 F.2d 939 (lth Cir.
1992).
106. See, e.g., French v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 784 F.2d 902 (9th
Cir. 1986); Swift Indus., Inc. v. Botany Indus., Inc., 466 F.2d 1125 (3d Cir. 1972).
107. See, e.g., Employers Ins. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 933 F.2d 1481 (9th Cir. 1991);
Seymour, 988 F.2d at 1020; Anderman/Smith Operating Co. v. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., 918
F.2d 1215 (5th Cir. 1990); Inter-City Gas Corp. v. Boise Cascade Corp., 845 F.2d 184 (8th
Cir. 1988); John T. Brady & Co. v. Form-Eze Sys., Inc., 623 F.2d 261 (2d Cir. 1980).
108. See, e.g., Valentine Sugars, Inc. v. Donau Corp., 981 F.2d 210 (5th Cir. 1993);
Siegel v. Titan Indus. Corp., 779 F.2d 891 (2d Cir. 1985); Stephen L. Hayford, Law in
Disarray: Judicial Standards for Vacatur of Commercial Arbitration Awards, 30 GA. L.
REV. 731, 764-801 (1996) (describing the courts' use of each of these standards in relation
to the statutory standards).
109. See, e.g., LeRoy & Feuille, supra note 7 (confirming the prevalence of the
"manifest disregard" standard in a study of both labor and employment arbitration
between 1991 and 2001).
Courts disagree on whether the parties can vary the standard of review by agreement.
Compare, for example, Lapine Technology Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., 130 F.3d 884 (9th Cir.
1997) (holding that the court must honor such agreements) and Gateway Technology, Inc.
v. MCI Telecommunications Corp., 64 F.3d 993 (5th Cir. 1995) (accord) with Bowen v.
Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding inappropriate party attempts
to "determine how federal courts review arbitration awards" and the threat to the
arbitration process that would be posed by permitting the parties to alter the standard of
review.)
110. 346 U.S. 427.
111. Id. at 428-29.
could not properly deprive the claimant of a judicial forum."2
However, the Supreme Court refused to enforce the arbitration
provision, in part because the narrow scope of arbitral review
prevented the "exercise of judicial direction to fairly assure [the]
effectiveness" of the Securities Act's protective provisions."3 In the
Court's view, this limited role for courts in an arbitration regime
would constitute a waiver of rights in violation of section 14 of the
Securities Act.14 The Court alluded to the standard of review that
accounted for this limited judicial role as follows:
While it may be true ... that a failure of the arbitrators to decide in
accordance with the provisions of the Securities Act would
"constitute grounds for vacating the award pursuant to section 10 of
the Federal Arbitration Act," that failure would need to be made
clearly to appear. In unrestricted submissions, such as the present
margin agreements envisage, the interpretations of the law by the
arbitrators in contrast to manifest disregard are not subject, in the
federal courts, to judicial review for error in interpretation.
5
Justice Jackson concurred, primarily because the arbitration
agreement preceded the dispute."6 He found it unnecessary "to
decide that the Arbitration Act precludes any judicial remedy for the
arbitrators' error of interpretation of a relevant statute. '.. 7
Dissenting, Justice Frankfurter declared that "[a]rbitrators may not
disregard the law."".8 He agreed with Chief Judge Swan of the Second
Circuit that arbitrators are "bound to decide in accordance with the
provisions of [the Securities Act]" and said further, "[o]n this we are
all agreed."'"9 This colloquy among the Justices suggests that they
may not have understood the "manifest disregard" standard as
erecting a high barrier to judicial scrutiny of the merits of an award.
Four years after Gilmer, the Supreme Court again mentioned
"manifest disregard" in First Options of Chicago v. Kaplan, a case
involving a dispute between an investment company and its two
principals, on the one hand, and a stock trading firm on the other.'
Also, unlike Gilmer, the issue in the First Options arbitration was
contractual rather than statutory."' The question addressed by the
112. Id. at 429-30.
113. Id. at 437.
114. Id. at 438.
115. Id. at 436-37 (citing Wilko v. Swan, 201 F.2d 439, 445 (1953)).
116. Id.
117. Id. at 439.
118. Id. at 440.
119. Id.
120. First Options of Chicago v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995).
121. Id. at 941.
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Court was who should decide the arbitrability of the dispute-the
arbitrator or the court.122 The Court referred to the narrow scope of
review of arbitral awards to explain the pivotal significance of the
question and held that, in the absence of the parties' clear agreement
to submit the question to arbitration, the courts decide.
The lower courts have taken these references in both Wilko and
First Options to mean that the "manifest disregard" standard applies
in employment disputes involving statutory issues.' 24  Those courts
have also entered the breach to supply content to the standards in the
face of virtually no guidance from the Supreme Court.2 1 Courts will
not set aside awards under this standard-even if arbitrators
misinterpret or misapply a federal statute-unless the law is totally
clear, the arbitrator understood the law, and chose to ignore it.
26
Predictably, under this interpretation of "manifest disregard," awards
are rarely set aside.27
An example of such a rarity can be found in Halligan v. Piper
Jaffray, Inc., where Theodore Halligan, hired in 1973 by Piper as a
salesman of equity investments for financial institutions, was required
at the time of his employment to sign the National Association of
Securities Dealers ("NASD") U-4 form containing an agreement to
arbitrate any future dispute. 28 Halligan claimed that a new CEO and
his immediate supervisor forced him from his job in December of
1992 because of his age.29 In Halligan's October 1993 arbitration,
continued by his wife following his death, Halligan submitted
evidence of his continuing high performance as a salesman at the time
of his termination as well as statements such as the following
indicating a discriminatory motive: "you're too old," "our clients are
young and they want young salesmen," and "we want you out of here
quickly."'"3 Halligan also produced witnesses who testified to Piper's
122. Id.
123. Id. at 943-44. See Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 123 S. Ct. 588, 592-93
(2002), for the Court's most recent reiteration of this standard.
124. See supra note 109.
125. Id.
126. See, e.g., DiRussa v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 121 F.3d 818 (2d Cir. 1997); see
Katherine Van Wesel Stone, 77 N.C. L. Rev. 931, 955 (1999) (desribing "[t]he manifest
disregard standard and the lack of an obligation for arbitrators to write opinions [as
having] made arbitral awards virtually bulletproof").
127. Id.; LaPrade v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 94 F. Supp. 2d 2 (D.D.C. 2000).
128. 148 F.3d 197, 198 (2d Cir. 1998); see also Montes v. Shearson Lehman Bros., 128
F.3d 1456 (11th Cir. 1997).
129. Halligan, 148 F.3d at 198.
130. Id. at 198-99.
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expressed intention to fire Halligan because of his age.'3' Company
witnesses contradicted this evidence, and the arbitration panel issued
a written award setting forth the claims and defenses of each party
and denying relief to the Halligans without explanation.'32 Mrs.
Halligan petitioned the district court to vacate the arbitration award
under section 10(a) of the FAA, arguing that the strong evidence of
age discrimination and the clear description of the law presented to
the arbitrators showed a manifest disregard of the law.'33 The district
court, considering the conflicting evidence on discrimination, the
absence of a written opinion, and the arbitration panel's apparent
crediting of the employer's witnesses over Halligan's, concluded that
the panel did not manifestly disregard the law.'
Acknowledging that the "manifest disregard" standard "means
more than error or misunderstanding with respect to the law,"'35 the
Second Circuit nonetheless reversed, citing the strong evidence that
Halligan's discharge was because of his age and the panel's awareness
of the applicable law. The court also considered the panel's failure to
explain its decision as supporting the inference of "manifest
disregard."'36  While noting the non-existence of an obligation to
explain an award, the court argued that it was entitled to consider the
panel's failure to explain the award where the evidence tended to
support the conclusion that the panel manifestly disregarded the
law.'37 The court concluded: "In view of the strong evidence that
Halligan was fired because of his age and the agreement of the parties
that the arbitrators were correctly advised of the applicable legal
principles, we are inclined to hold that [the arbitrators] ignored the
law or the evidence or both."'38
Another rare example of the setting aside of an award under the
"manifest disregard" standard can be found in Montes v. Shearson
Lehman Bros.'"3 In that case, an arbitration panel found that an
employee, Montes, who had worked in excess of forty hours per
week, was not entitled to overtime pay, even though the Fair Labor
Standards Act ("FLSA") required the payment of overtime to
131. Id. at 199.
132. Id. at 200.
133. Id.
134. Id.




139. 128 F.3d 1456, 1464 (11th Cir. 1997).
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covered employees who worked more than forty hours per week. 4'
The employer had argued that Montes was an exempt employee, not
covered by the FLSA.14' Additionally, the employer's counsel had
encouraged the arbitration panel in opening statement and closing
argument not to follow the FLSA, should it find that Montes was a
non-exempt employee. 142  The Eleventh Circuit vacated and
remanded the arbitration award to a different arbitration panel,
finding that the panel deciding the case had manifestly disregarded
the law.'43 In reaching this conclusion, the court considered the
"absence of any stated reasons for the decision," the "marginal
evidence" before the panel, and counsel's encouragement of the
panel to disregard the law.' The court observed that there was
nothing in the "record to refute the suggestion that the law was
disregarded... [n]or does the record clearly support the award.' 45
While reaffirming the Wilko dictum that arbitrators are not
obligated to explain their reasons for an award, the court in Montes
nonetheless treated the absence of stated reasons as supporting an
inference that the law had been ignored and pointed to the record as
containing "nothing... that refute[d] the inference.' 46 In reaching
the conclusion that the factual record did not support the arbitral
ruling, the court reviewed the evidence that Montes was exempt from
the FLSA and found that his primary duties were not exempted. 47
This finding, along with counsel's urging the arbitration panel to
disregard the law and the absence of evidence that the panel rejected
this plea, led to the Court's order vacating the award and remanding
the case to a new arbitration panel.
4 1
DiRussa v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. is a more typical case, in
which a reviewing court found no manifest disregard despite clear
error.149 In DiRussa, a forty-two-year branch manager for Dean
Witter Reynolds-and registered representative of the NASD who
signed the U-4 form--challenged a demotion as violative of the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"). 50  Ultimately,
140. See 29 U.S.C. § 207(a) (1) (1998).
141. Montes, 128 F.3d at 1459.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 1464.
144. Id. at 1461-62.
145. Id. at 1462.
146. Id. at 1461 n.8.
147. Id. at 1464.
148. Id.
149. 121 F.3d at 827-28.
150. Id. at 820.
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Raymond DiRussa arbitrated the claim before a NASD panel, which
upheld the claim and awarded DiRussa damages but failed to award
him attorney's fees as mandated by the ADEA.' 1 Despite finding a
"well-defined, explicit and clearly applicable" mandate in the ADEA
for attorney's fees, the district court denied DiRussa's motion to
modify or vacate the award for violating the mandate because
DiRussa had not argued to the arbitration panel that the award of
attorney's fees was mandatory under the ADEA.'52 The Second
Circuit affirmed, noting that DiRussa's failure to communicate the
applicable law to the arbitration panel defeated the claim of
"manifest disregard," even though the law was well-defined and the
panel's ruling was clearly erroneous.1 5 3
b. Critical Commentary
Courts and scholars have expressed a variety of views on the
appropriate review standard in statutory arbitration cases. In Cole v.
Burns, the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed
the district court's dismissal of an employee's Title VII complaint
filed following his discharge from the company.154 The dismissal was
based on an agreement that the employee signed at the time of hire to
arbitrate any claims arising from the termination of his employment
and to waive his right to a jury trial.' The court, speaking through
Chief Judge Harry Edwards, an eminent labor law scholar and former
arbitrator, addressed Cole's claim that the agreement was
unconscionable because the arbitrator's interpretation of the statute
would not be subject to judicial review.'56 The court rejected Cole's
claim based on the existence of statutory and non-statutory grounds
of judicial review under the FAA.'57 While it conceded the limited
scope of review of collective bargaining awards, the court opined that
a broader standard of review would be more appropriate in statutory
151. Id.
152. DiRussa v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 936 F. Supp. 104, 106-07 (S.D.N.Y. 1996);
cf. DeGaetano v. Smith Barney, Inc., 983 F. Supp. 459 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding that the
arbitration panel acted in manifest disregard of the law in failing to award attorneys fees in
a Title VII case where the parties "unequivocally" notified the panel of the "governing
legal principles").
153. DiRussa, 121 F.3d at 822-23; cf. DeGaetano, 983 F. Supp. 459 (where the court
found manifest disregard in the refusal to award attorney's fees, because the arbitration
panel was given notice of the attorney's fees provision of the statute).
154. 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
155. Id. at 1467-68.
156. Id. at 1460.
157. Id. at 1486.
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cases in light of Gilmer's pronouncements about the retention of
substantive rights in statutory arbitration and the sufficiency of
judicial review In the court's view, the "manifest disregard"
standard should be defined to permit "[a] focused review of arbitral
legal [as opposed to factual] determinations.., to ensure that [an
arbitrator's] resolution of public law issues is correct." '59
Professor Norman S. Poser perceives the "manifest disregard"
standard as inadequate to protect important statutory rights and
notices a shift toward greater scrutiny in some courts' treatment of
awards under the standard.1" In light of these considerations he has
proposed the following standard: "An award should be vacated or
modified if it shows an extraordinary lack of fidelity to established
legal principles or an egregious departure from established law. '61
This broader standard would focus on whether the arbitrator had
properly interpreted and applied the law. Poser believes that this
standard would encourage arbitrators to find out what the law is, and
it does not penalize parties who fail to bring the law to the attention
of the arbitrator.162
In Professor Poser's view, the Second Circuit in Halligan and the
District of Columbia Circuit in Cole have already adopted a new
standard of review; Halligan by vacating an award as against the
weight of the evidence rather than in manifest disregard of the law,
and Cole by expressly requiring that review be "sufficiently rigorous
to ensure that arbitrators have properly interpreted and applied
statutory law.' ' 63 Moreover, unlike the court in Cole, Poser argues
that this broader standard of review should apply to all awards,
statutory and non-statutory.'6
In an article that thoughtfully incorporates contemporary
jurisprudential ideas, Professors Martin H. Malin and Robert F.
Ladenson have also proposed a change in the manifest disregard
standard .' However, they recognize the peculiar history and purpose
of labor arbitration and the threat to the finality and efficiency of
158. Id. at 1487.
159. Id.
160. Norman S. Poser, Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards: Manifest Disregard of
the Law, 64 BROOK. L. REv. 471, 473-74 (1998).
161. Id. at 518. Poser reaches this conclusion in part by examining the definition of
disregard, "lack of thoughtful attention or due regard," and clarifying the court rather
than the arbitrator as the tribunal to whom the disregard must be manifest. See id. at 510.
162. Id. at 515.
163. Cole, 105 F.3d at 1487.
164. Poser, supra note 160, at 518.
165. See Malin & Ladenson, supra note 9, at 1190.
arbitration that expansive judicial review of the merits would pose.'66
Accordingly, they suggest a continuation of the narrow scope of
review of labor arbitration awards that the Supreme Court has
sanctioned in Enterprise Wheel and W.R. Grace/Misco/Eastern Coal
(the public policy cases). 16' 7 For employment arbitration, Malin and
Ladenson propose a standard of "broad deference to arbitral factual
findings and de novo review of arbitral legal conclusions."'68 Positing
that most of the expense and delay associated with litigation derives
from factfinding, they argue that most of the efficiencies of arbitration
will be preserved by a rule that establishes finality in factfinding.1
6
1
Professors Malin and Ladenson believe that reserving de novo review
for arbitral interpretations of the law "will have minimal impact
on... [the] finality of employment arbitration[,] ... [while providing]
the legitimacy that would otherwise be lacking in the privatization of
public workplace justice."'70
Professor Stephen Hayford has exhaustively surveyed the
developing law on judicial standards for vacatur of commercial
arbitration awards, both statutory-under section 10(a) of the FAA-
and non-statutory.71 He argues that the statutory standards of
vacatur set forth in section 10(a) advance the FAA's public policy of
giving effect to agreements to arbitrate.'72 In Hayford's words:
Win or lose, the agreement to arbitrate reflects an enforceable
contractual commitment by the parties to forego resort to the
166. Id. at 1192.
167. Id. at 1196.
168. Id. at 1238. The court in Cole specifically adopted this position as articulated in
Malin, supra note 1. See Cole, 105 F.3d at 1487.
169. Id. at 1290.
170. Malin & Ladenson, supra note 9, at 1238. In their view employment arbitration
without appropriate judicial review loses legitimacy, because legitimacy in the
enforcement of public law comes with political accountability. Id. at 1237. They articulate
this view as follows:
To ensure that public law continues to develop in accordance with public justice
values as articulated by publicly accountable judges constrained by the principle
of integrity, arbitral legal conclusions must be subject to de novo judicial or
administrative review. Only the judge has the legitimacy conferred by the
legislature to authoritatively continue the chain novel based on a balancing of
Dworkin's dimensions.
Id.
171. Stephen L. Hayford, A New Paradigm for Commercial Arbitration: Rethinking the
Relationship Between Reasoned Awards and the Judicial Standards for Vacatur, 66 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 443 (1998) [hereinafter New Paradigm]; Stephen L. Hayford, Reigning in
the "Manifest Disregard" of the Law Standard: The Key to Restoring Order to the Law of
Vacatur, J. DISP. RESOL. 117,128-32 (1998) [hereinafter Reigning in]; Hayford, supra note
108.
172. Hayford, supra note 108, at 741-43.
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courts in order to secure the benefits of arbitration. The parties can
expect no more than that for which they have bargained. A party
dissatisfied with the outcome of a commercial arbitration
proceeding 'may not seek a second bite at the apple simply because
(it) desires(s) a different outcome.' Dissatisfaction with the results
of the arbitration tribunal is not a good reason for the loser to seek
vacatur of the award.... The public policy reflected in the Federal
Arbitration Act is intended to give effect to the bargain just
described and to hold the parties to it by enforcing the agreement
to arbitrate and making it very difficult to secure judicial vacatur of
objectionable arbitration awards. "3
Under this policy, the courts are not to assess the merits of
arbitration awards; rather, they are to "monitor the procedure that
leads to the commercial arbitration award in order to assure the
award's essential fairness and the arbitrator's neutrality.'
' 4
Based on the statutory framework, Hayford argues that the
"manifest disregard" standard should not be applied to reverse an
award based on an erroneous interpretation of the law; rather, it
should be narrowly interpreted as a form of arbitral misconduct
"captured" by section 10(a)(3) of the FAA.'75 Only if an arbitrator
engaged in the misconduct of understanding the law and ignoring it
should the award be vacated.'76 Excluding "public policy" review,
which inheres in a court's common law power to refuse to enforce any
contract that violates public policy and does not require an inquiry
into the merits, Hayford regards the other non-statutory grounds as
applicable to labor arbitration and inapposite to commercial
arbitration.'77 He argues that the statutory grounds contained in
section 10(a) of the FAA as supplemented by "public policy" should
be exclusive in order to "stabilize the law of vacatur [and] return it to
its true origin.' '78 Professor Hayford also observes that an untoward
consequence of the non-statutory grounds of vacatur is the
unwillingness of commercial arbitrators to write reasoned awards,
which are more susceptible to review on the merits.'79 Since the
173. Id. at 741-42 (footnotes omitted).
174. New Paradigm, supra note 171, at 500.
175. Id. at 475.
176. Hayford, supra note 108, at 817.
177. Id. at 814-15.
178. Id. at 841.
179. New Paradigm, supra note 171, at 501. Hayford argues that the current system
(termed the current paradigm) with no reasoned awards and review on non-statutory
grounds disserves the parties, since the virtually non-existent vacatur rate under non-
statutory standards makes the guarantee of justice by judicial review illusory. Id. at 500.
And, perhaps, relying upon judicial review the parties,
[b]y failing to make a rigorous effort at the front end, pre-award stage of the
dearth of reasoned awards in commercial arbitration disserves the
parties, Hayford advocates a regime of reasoned commercial
arbitration awards coupled with a narrow scope of review limited to
the statutory grounds of section 10(a), as well as "manifest disregard"
and "public policy," both narrowly construed."'0
In his most recent work, Professor Hayford reviews case law
development in both the labor and commercial arbitration fields,
points out their common heritage, and advocates a unified approach
to questions of enforceability, arbitrability, and vacatur in both
areas.'81 He points out that such an approach would not involve a
radical departure from the virtual identity of judicial treatment of
both sets of arbitration issues. Viewing the vacatur issue as
troubling in both the labor and commercial arbitration arenas,
Hayford proposes unification of vacatur standards under section
10(a) of the FAA, augmented by the "manifest disregard" and
"publi policy" non-statutory standards narrowly interpreted."' 3
(2) The Standards Vacuum
None of these views of judicial review fully captures the
competing concerns reflected in both the cases and the literature.
Vacatur based on the degree of error committed by the arbitrator
makes arbitration a surrogate trial court and diminishes its essential
advantages-finality, informality, speed, and affordability. Hence,
Professor Poser's "extraordinary lack of fidelity/egregious departure"
standard, Professors Malin's and Ladenson's and Cole's bifurcated de
novo review approach, the courts' manifest disregard standard
broadly construed, and other non-statutory standards all pose an
unacceptable threat to arbitration. On the other hand, Professor
Hayford's advocacy of statutory grounds only, augmented by the
"manifest disregard" and "public policy" standards narrowly
construed, gives insufficient recognition to legitimate reasons for
judicial scrutiny of the merits and vacatur of the awards in some
cases.
process (in negotiating the arbitration agreement, selecting the arbitrator,
evaluating arbitral performance, fashioning the case-in-chief in a manner that
takes full advantage of the presence of a sophisticated, mutually selected expert
adjudicator, and the like), the parties greatly increase the likelihood that the
result reached at the end of the process will be unsatisfactory.
Id. at 501.
180. Hayford, supra note 108, at 841-42.
181. Hayford, supra note 99.
182. Id. at 926-27.
183. Id.
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A standard that permits judges to reverse arbitration awards
based on error alone would unduly undermine the finality of the
process and eventually lead to the diminution or extinction of the
institution of arbitration. Over time the parties may become
unwilling to invest in a system that cannot deliver on the promise of
finality, informality, speed, and economy. The diminished utility of
arbitration may lead to less access to rights enforcement under
protective legislation. On the other hand, the total absence of
scrutiny in public law cases would constitute abdication of the courts'
responsibility to protect the public interest and lead to a dilution of
statutory protections, a result of arbitration that the Supreme Court
disavowed in Gilmer.184
The Supreme Court's confidence in arbitration, expressed in
Gilmer and other recent cases under the FAA, contemplates a
process capable of fairly hearing and deciding statutory issues.
Hence, the question that defines the standard of review in the United
States should be whether the arbitration process worked as
contemplated. What is contemplated depends upon whether the
arbitration was private (contractual) or public (statutory). In
contractual arbitration it is expected that the arbitrator will be
independent, impartial, fair, and responsive to contractual limitations
on arbitral authority and the obligation to issue an intelligible award.
The arbitrator's reading of the contract is what the parties bargained
for, and it should be final even if it is wrong.
The federal common law and the FAA appropriately limit
judicial intervention to set aside arbitration awards in private
contractual matters. The law of labor arbitration has long
contemplated the possibility of error in arbitration awards. Yet the
Steelworkers Trilogy does not permit courts to set aside labor
arbitration awards on the basis of error alone. 86 As long as the award
draws its essence from the agreement, the courts must enforce it. 87
Similarly, commercial arbitration awards in private contractual
184. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 32 n.4 (1991). In Gilmer,
the Court, in rejecting the contention that judicial review of arbitration awards is too
limited, said: "although judicial scrutiny of arbitration awards necessarily is limited, such
review is sufficient to ensure that arbitrators comply with the requirements of the statute
at issue." Id. (citing Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 232
(1987))
185. See St. Antoine, supra note 13, at 1140 (describing the arbitrator as the parties'
contract reader).




matters have been largely insulated from judicial review."' In private
arbitration, courts should review awards for procedural integrity. If
an award has not been procured through fraud, procedural
irregularity, or arbitral misconduct, it should be enforced under the
FAA.18 9
In statutory arbitration, mere procedural integrity is not
sufficient. Arbitration is also expected to satisfy the public interest in
enforcing a statute of general applicability-for example, by
protecting citizens from discrimination on the basis of race, gender,
religion, age, or disability. The public policy that justifies the
overturning of an offending labor or commercial arbitration award
also warrants judicial review of an award that interprets public laws
designed to advance important public values. 19  These policies
compete with the FAA's policy of giving effect to arbitration
agreements. 9' And unless Congress has mandated the supremacy of
188. See Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198, 203 n.4 (1955) (noting the
narrow scope of review in commercial arbitration cases); Alleyne, supra note 1, at 421
(comparing the greater frequency of vacatur in labor than commercial arbitration).
189. FAA section 10 grounds for vacatur of arbitration awards captures this procedural
integrity. At one level arbitral integrity is procedural. The parties choosing the arbitral
forum expect it to supply certain minimum values, such as a neutral process where the
outcome is uninfluenced by fraud, corruption, arbitral partiality, or misconduct in the
administration of the hearing. This level of integrity may be thought of as procedural
integrity.
190. See supra notes 69-85 and accompanying text. Some courts have interpreted
public policy review in this fashion. For example, in Seymour v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield,
988 F.2d 1020 (10th Cir. 1993), the Tenth Circuit found that there was no clear violation of
Utah public policy prohibiting the modification of insurance contract without the
agreement in writing of the party against whose interest the modification runs. In
reaching this conclusion the court examined the evidence showing that the insureds had
been reissued a contract containing the modification, acknowledged receipt, and
continued to pay premiums. Id. at 1025. Based on these facts the court found that "[t]he
arbitrators could have reasonably construed the facts of this case to meet the
requirement... that a modification be 'in writing and agreed to by the party against whose
interest the modification operates."' Id. at 1024. (quoting UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-21-
106 (1985)). Similarly, the Eighth Circuit in Paine Webber Inc. v. Argon, 49 F.3d 347 (8th
Cir. 1995), found that an arbitration panel's refusal to uphold the discharge of a Vice
President and Registered Representative for signing a customer's name on an IRA
account was not a violation of the public policy of honesty in the securities industry as
reflected in the company's rules. The court reviewed the panel's findings in light of the
evidence and found no violation of public policy. Id. at 352. Professor Hayford criticizes
this view of public policy, because it permits the reviewing court to focus on the
correctness of the arbitrator's interpretation and application of the law. Hayford, supra
note 101, at 925-26.
191. In his Postscript on the history of American arbitration law Professor Macneil
predicts that "major fault lines run through the law, along which tensions exist or will build
up." MACNEIL, supra note 38, at 175. Specifically, he says: "[T]ension is inevitable
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one statute over another, courts have a responsibility to reconcile the
two.1" Moreover, given the FAA's predating of modern anti-
discrimination legislation, it is difficult to argue that FAA policy
between the freedom of arbitrators to make final decisions and the need for judicial
oversight when their decisions concern important regulatory legislation." Id.
In Wilko v. Swan, the Court recognized the clash between competing policies of enforcing
arbitration agreements and protecting investors in the following terms:
Two policies, not easily reconcilable, are involved in this case. Congress has
afforded participants in transactions subject to its legislative power an
opportunity generally to secure prompt, economical and adequate solution of
controversies through arbitration if the parties are willing to accept less certainty
of legally correct adjustment.... On the other hand, it has enacted the Securities
Act to protect the rights of investors and has forbidden a waiver of any of those
rights. Recognizing the advantages that prior agreements for arbitration may
provide for the solution of commercial controversies, we decide that the
intention of Congress concerning the sale of securities is better carried out by
holding invalid such an agreement for arbitration of issues arising under the Act.
346 U.S. 427, 438 (1953). See also the reference in American Safety Equipment Corp. v.
J.P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821, 826 (2d Cir. 1968), to the following "clash of competing
fundamental policies... the conflict between federal statutory protection of a large
segment of the public, frequently in an inferior bargaining position, and encouragement of
arbitration as a 'prompt, economical and adequate solution of controversies."' (citing
Wilko, 346 U.S. at 438).
Though the Court overruled Wilko in Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American
Express, 490 U.S. 477 (1989), it did not intend to signal an end to the clash of competing
public policies. Rather, it simply found the tension insufficient to justify refusing to
enforce pre-dispute arbitration agreements. Id. However, the Court's pronouncements in
Gilmer make it clear that this tension requires the continuing involvement of the courts in
the form of judicial review. See supra note 184 and accompanying text. For example, in
DiRussa v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 121 F.3d 818, 820 (2d Cir. 1997), a post-Gilmer case
brought to vacate or modify an arbitration award, the court began its decision as follows:
"This case implicates the possible clash between two important federal policies: deference
to arbitration awards in order to promote that important method of dispute resolution and
enforcement of the remedial provisions of a federal statute-the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967...."
192. See, e.g., NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513 (1984) (resolving the tension
between the policy of rehabilitation under the bankruptcy laws and the enforcement of
collective bargaining agreement under the labor laws); Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S.
883, 893 (1984) (where the Court sanctioned the NLRB's application of the unfair labor
practices provisions to undocumented aliens as an effort to reconcile the NLRA and the
Immigration and Nationality Act). It should be noted that the Court in EEOC v. Waffle
House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 290-91 (2002), rejected the Fourth Circuit's effort to reconcile
the FAA and Title VII by preventing the EEOC from suing for victim-specific relief
because the arbitration agreement did not bind the EEOC and Title VII gave the EEOC
authority to seek such relief. The suggested reconciling of the two statutes under the
integrity review proposal does not disserve the FAA policy of putting arbitration
agreements on the same footing as other contracts or the Title VII policy of protecting the
public from employment discrimination. Rather, it serves both policies by bringing to
statutory arbitration awards the same kind of public policy scrutiny that the courts have
effected in other arbitration contract cases and increasing the protection of rights under
Title VII by increasing the quality of arbitrations.
should trump other subsequently enacted substantial congressional
pronouncements.193 When commercial arbitrators, such as the one in
Gilmer, are called upon to interpret the provisions of Title VII
barring employment discrimination based on race, sex, age, religion,
national origin, and disability, for example, the judiciary must act in
the public interest by exercising some oversight of the merits of the
award. The crucial issue in reconciling the competing policies of the
FAA and statutes like Title VII is how much oversight will give
adequate effect to one without unduly undermining the other.9
In public arbitration cases, courts should review arbitration
awards not only for "procedural integrity" but for integrity in the
arbitrator's substantive deliberations as well. This necessarily
involves a consideration of the merits, but not a reversal simply
because the court would not have reached the result that the
arbitrator reached. Rather, this examination of substantive integrity
entails a review of the arbitrator's reasoning process to determine
whether the arbitrator's reasons plausibly lead to the decision.
C. Integrity
In Gilmer, the Supreme Court's confidence in the preservation of
statutory protection under an arbitral regime was premised in part on
the belief that arbitrators are capable of adequately adjudicating
statutory issues and in part on the adequacy of judicial review.9
Assuming that this faith in arbitrators is warranted, the judicial
scrutiny of the merits of arbitration awards might be properly limited
to an inquiry into whether the arbitrator was faithful to the obligation
to adjudicate the dispute. This standard reflects a concern about
arbitral integrity.
The Oxford English Dictionary defines integrity in two senses
that are particularly relevant to this discussion:
1. The condition of having no part or element taken away or
wanting; undivided or unbroken state; material wholeness,
completeness, entirety.
3b. Soundness of moral principle; the character of uncorrupted
193. See William Nichol Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L.
REV. 1479 (1987).
194. This classical statement of a balancing test was made famous by the court in NLRB
v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 112 (1956) (saying that the accommodation
between organizational and property rights "must be obtained with as little destruction of
one as is consistent with the maintenance of the other").
195. See 500 U.S. 20, 35 (1991).
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virtue, esp. in relation to truth and fair dealing; uprightness,
honesty, sincerity.
196
These definitions suggest that integrity is a unity between deeply
held values and human activity, where the former is consistently
demonstrated through the latter.
Integrity is also a virtue that permeates the activity of human
decision-making. Whether the decisional choices are small, such as
the issue of whether to lie to a friend about the attractiveness of a
new hair style, or momentous-like the question of whether to cast a
congressional vote in favor of the death penalty or funding stem cell
research-the decision is informed by some reference to a set of
values held by the decision maker. Integrity determines the extent to
which the decision conforms to those values.1 98
Adjudication is formalized decisionmaking practiced by courts,
administrative agencies, and arbitrators.' 99 The values that inform
adjudication are those incorporated in decisional rules that must be
applied as well as those that dictate an approach to decision-making.
Values to be applied-decisional rules-are embodied in the law as
manifested in statutes, the common law, contracts, principles, and
policies." The process of determining how the values reflected in the
law should shape the outcome in specific cases-the decisional
196. THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1066 (2d ed. 1989).
197. See MARTIN BENJAMIN, SPLITTING THE DIFFERENCE: COMPROMISE AND
INTEGRITY IN ETHICS AND POLITICS 54, 59-74 (1990) (describing integrity as "largely a
formal notion... [that] regulates the connections among values, words, and deeds and
suggesting that the complexity of competing values might warrant moral compromise");
STEPHEN L. CARTER, (INTEGRITY) 7 (1996) (defining integrity as involving the following
three steps: "(1) discerning what is right and what is wrong; (2) acting on what you have
discerned, even at personal cost; and (3) saying openly that you are acting on your
understanding of right from wrong") (emphasis omitted).
198. See G. RICHARD SHELL, BARGAINING FOR ADVANTAGE: NEGOTIATION
STRATEGIES FOR REASONABLE PEOPLE 18, 205 (1999) (describing "a commitment to
personal integrity in negotiation" as follows: "effective negotiators can be counted on to
negotiate consistently, using a thoughtful set of personal values that they could, if
necessary, explain and defend to others").
199. The Oxford English Dictionary defines "adjudicate" as follows:
ADJUDICATE... To adjudge;.., to try and determine judicially ....
ADJUDGE ... To settle, determine or decide, judicially ....
JUDICIALLY... After the manner of a judge; with judicial knowledge and skill;
critically.
THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 196, at 158, 157,297.
200. See STEVEN J. BURTON, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND LEGAL REASONING 1
(2d ed. 1995).
approach-involves applying the law to a set of facts through legal
reasoning."'
Arbitration as a species of adjudication has been described as
"principled adjudication," a process of applying arbitral standards
through legal reasoning." As a practical matter, legal reasoning
entails: (1) identifying the law applicable to a legal problem, (2)
considering all of the relevant evidence that bears upon the problem,
(3) focusing on the purposes of legal rules where appropriate to
determine the important facts, (4) using analogical and deductive
reasoning to reach a legal conclusion on those facts, and (5)
explaining how the law as applied to the facts leads to the conclusion
reached. 23 These components of legal reasoning may be thought of
generally as law-finding, fact-finding, and law-applying. In the case of
adjudication, integrity is the unity of values and activity inherent in
this professional approach to decision-making.0" Substantive integrity
should be thought of as fidelity to this approach. An arbitrator's
201. In a text designed to introduce beginning law students to legal reasoning Professor
Burton says the following:
[Judges] should apply the law to the facts of a case to yield legal reasons, which
are reasons for action by law-abiding people. For example, a red light plus a rule
requiring motorists to stop at red lights is a legal reason for Mitchell Motorist to
stop. It is also a reason for a lawyer to predict that a judge would fine Mitch if he
did not stop, a reason for a prosecutor to urge a judge or jury to convict him, and
a reason for a judge or jury to do so. Legal reasoning is the process of using legal
reasons in legal arguments.
Id.
202. Roger I. Abrams, The Nature of the Arbitral Process: Substantive Decision-Making
in Labor Arbitration, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 551, 555 (1981).
203. See BURTON, supra note 200, at 25-115. Discussing labor arbitration, Dean
Abrams says:
Labor arbitration is a process of principled adjudication. Arbitrators make
decisions in cases presented to them on the basis of an established body of
arbitral jurisprudence.... Once questions of fact are resolved, the labor
arbitrator selects appropriate adjudicatory standards from the body of arbitral
jurisprudence and applies those standards by reasoning from the facts to a
conclusion. The process of decision-making in labor arbitration is essentially
rational and principled. Arbitrators customarily explicate the basis for their
decisions in the form of a written opinion, which follows a standard form.
Abrams, supra note 202, at 554-55 (footnotes omitted).
204. Referring to the parties' mutually determined choice of rules to govern their
workplace, Dean Abrams speaks as follows of integrity in labor arbitration as requiring
the arbitrator to apply those rules rather than the arbitrator's personal views as manager
of the parties' needs: "[h]owever, the arbitration process contemplates a less expansive
role [than manager]. Fidelity by an arbitrator to the choices made by the parties supports
not only the integrity of the bargaining process, but also, on a larger scale, the entire
autonomous system of industrial self-government." Abrams, supra note 202, at 554-55
(footnotes omitted).
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failure to apply the applicable law through legal reasoning would
warrant a finding that an erroneous decision should be vacated as
lacking substantive integrity.05
However, even fidelity to each of the elements of legal reasoning
may not lead to a particular outcome that the reviewing court would
regard as correct. This is particularly true in cases involving weighing
evidence, applying a flexible standard such as "reasonableness," or
interpreting unsettled law. Such cases leave room for the exercise of
judgment which might vary within some reasonable range among
adjudicators. Under this view, a decision may have substantive
integrity yet still be regarded by the reviewing court as incorrect.
Under the proposed standard, such an award should be enforced.
Table II includes the substantive integrity standard in the ranking
of degrees of restrictiveness of review standards set forth in Table I.
The integrity standard ranks second most restrictive after the labor
arbitration standard and ahead of the "sufficient evidence" standard.
Like the essence/public policy standard of labor arbitration, the
integrity standard constrains review of the merits; however, unlike the
labor arbitration standard, an erroneous decision is not respected
under this standard unless it reflects a reasoned approach to decision-
making. This standard is deemed more restrictive than the "sufficient
evidence" standard, since the arbitrator's reasoning, based on perhaps
less evidence than the directed verdict threshold, may sustain an
award."6
205. When the result is correct, setting it aside based on faulty reasoning is
inappropriate. The arbitrator's intuition may have led to the result, and to not uphold it
would be needlessly to undermine the finality, informality and efficiency of arbitration.
See Roscoe Pound, The Theory of Judicial Decision, 36 HARV. L. REV. 940, 951 (1923); cf.
Solomon v. CCMA, (1999) 20 I.L.J. 2960 (LC) (S. Afr.), available at
http://www.legalinfo.co.za (where the reviewing court set aside a correct arbitration award
because of the faulty reasoning).
206. This borrows from the "hard look" approach articulated by Judge Levanthal in
Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1970), where he described
the court's function in reviewing administrative agency decisions as "assurfing] that the
agency [give] reasoned consideration to all the material facts and issues" and insisting
"that the agency articulate with reasonable clarity its reasons for decision, and identify the
significance of the crucial facts." Id. at 851. Describing its supervisory function more
generally, Judge Levanthal said:
Its supervisory function calls on the court to intervene not merely in case of
procedural inadequacies, or bypassing of the mandate in the legislative charter,
but more broadly if the court becomes aware, especially from a combination of
danger signals, that the agency has not really taken a "hard look" at the salient
problems, and has not genuinely engaged in reasoned decision-making. If the
agency has not shirked this fundamental task, however, the court exercises
restraint and affirms the agency's action even though the court would on its own
Table II
Standards of Review
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
I IiI
"Essence/ "Integrity" "Sufficient "Substantial "Clearly "Hard Look" "De Novo"
Public Policy" Employment Evidence" Evidence" Erroneous" APA T.Ct. Law/
Labor Arbitration Civil Juries Administrative T.Ct. Law/Mixed Mixed Law
Arbitration Law and Fact Fact Agency Fact Law and Fact and Fact
Law and Fact Fact
This bar graph depicts the degrees of restrictiveness of standards of
review including the "integrity" standard as a function of the showing
required to set aside the findings of lower tribunals.
D. Substantive Integrity Applied
(1) Illustration
Substantive integrity should be reflected in the three general
phases of adjudicative analysis-law-finding, fact-finding, and law
applying. An example will illustrate this point. Consider a case
where an employee-the manager at an equipment rental company-
quits her job because, she claims, the employer created a sexually
account have made different findings or adopted different standards. Nor will
the court upset a decision because of errors that are not material, there being
room for the doctrine of harmless error. If satisfied that the agency has taken a
hard look at the issues with the use of reasons and standards, the court will
uphold its findings, though of less than ideal clarity, if the agency's path may
reasonably be discerned, though of course the court must not be left to guess as
to the agency's findings or reasons.
The process thus combines judicial supervision with a salutary principle of
judicial restraint, an awareness that agencies and courts together constitute a
"partnership" in furtherance of the public interest, and are "collaborative
instrumentalities of justice."
Id. at 851-52.
The substantive integrity standard, however, is careful about the balance between
supervision and restraint, tilting more toward restraint with arbitral findings of fact and
mixed law and fact and more toward supervision with interpretations of law.
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hostile work environment. She has worked for the employer for one
year and during the last six months of her employment the company
president has made several inappropriate comments to her. On one
occasion he threw a dime in front of her and asked her to bend over
and pick it up. On another occasion he offered, in a sexually
suggestive manner, to negotiate her raise at the Holiday Inn. And on
a third occasion he asked her whether she had promised a customer
sex in order to close a deal. Following these three incidents, which
were spaced approximately two weeks apart, the employee resigned
and filed a grievance under the employer's arbitration procedure
alleging a violation of Title VII.
Assume that the arbitrator issued the award in this case before
the Supreme Court's 1993 decision in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc. °7
The Supreme Court has decided Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v.
Vinson, which defined Title VII's anti-discrimination provision as not
"limited to economic or tangible discrimination" but as directed as
well to the disparate treatment of men and women in the workplace
in the form of a hostile or abusive environment.0 8 The Meritor Court
termed as hostile or abusive: "discriminatory intimidation, ridicule,
and insult... [that is] sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the
conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working
environment. 209
Following the Meritor case, the Circuits split on whether
actionable work environment harassment needed to be so serious as
to cause psychological injury or only sufficiently serious to interfere
unreasonably with work performance or alter the conditions of
employment."' In Harris, decided after the hypothetical award, the
Supreme Court adopted the latter interpretation.211
If the arbitrator found the "psychological well-being test" to be
appropriate, rather than the "objectively hostile or abusive
environment test" adopted after the arbitrator's award by the Court
in Harris, the award could not be found to lack substantive integrity.
207. 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
208. 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994) providing:
(a) EMPLOYER PRACrICES
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex or national origin ....
209. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67.
210. See Harris, 510 U.S. at 20.
211. Id. at 21.
The arbitrator would be merely adopting one of two plausible legal
standards growing out of the Meritor precedent and supported by
Circuit Court interpretation.2"2
Equally sacrosanct should be the arbitrator's factual finding that
the grievant did not establish by a preponderance of the evidence that
two of the three incidents actually occurred. The arbitrator's
evaluation of the evidence produced by both the grievant and the
company president about whether the three incidents occurred, based
on any corroborating evidence and the credibility of witnesses, should
be upheld under a substantive integrity standard. As long as the
arbitrator's decision reflects some evaluation of the weight to be
given to the evidence in reasoning to the factual conclusion, the
arbitrator has performed the task as expected and the Court should
not reverse a decision that it views as erroneous."'
Under the substantive integrity standard, manifest disregard
would be the easiest case. Where the arbitrator understands the law
and chooses to ignore it, the erroneous decision would lack
substantive integrity since the arbitrator would have consciously
abandoned reason to reach an unsupported conclusion. However,
under the substantive integrity standard, if the arbitrator's ignorance
of the law results in no reasoning on the point and an erroneous
conclusion, the decision would also lack substantive integrity even in
the absence of manifest disregard. Similarly, if an arbitrator chooses
the wrong law to apply and reaches a conclusion that would have
been wrong under the applicable law, the conclusion, though
reasoned, is tantamount to the absence of reasoning under the
applicable law and therefore lacking in substantive integrity. 4
However, where the arbitrator chooses the correct law and applies it
through legal reasoning, the reviewing court could not properly set
aside the award based on a disagreement with the outcome."' For
212. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (where
the court supports an administrative agency's choice between plausible interpretations of a
statute); see also Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bobker, 808 F.2d 930 (2d
Cir. 1986) (in which the court approved the arbitration panel's refusal to follow an SEC
rule where the panel doubted the rationality of the rule in light of the language, purpose,
and history of the statute and no definitive court ruling on the issue).
213. Indeed, under all of the less restrictive standards set forth in Table II a factfinder's
conclusions are likely to be given such deference.
214. For example, if the arbitrator had selected a "mere offensiveness" rule, clearly
contrary to the Court's "severe or pervasive" standard in Meritor, to find that a single
comment by the president created an abusive working environment, the conclusion would
lack substantive integrity.
215. Though the conventional standard permits de novo review on these mixed
questions of law and fact, as noted in WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 16, § 2589, such an
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 54
January 2003] INTEGRITY REVIEW OF ARBITRATION AWARDS 353
example, changing the illustration slightly, in applying the
"objectively hostile or abusive environment" test to the same facts
after the Harris decision, the arbitrator's determination that the one
proven comment and other evidence produced by the rental company
equipment manager were insufficient to meet the hostile environment
test should not be disturbed, as long as the arbitrator set forth some
rational basis for the conclusion.
If an arbitrator's decision is wrong on the merits and there is no
reasoned written decision, the award would presumptively lack
substantive integrity and be subject to vacatur in the absence of
rebuttal evidence showing the outcome to be reasonable under some
interpretation and application of the law.216 Similarly, if no reasoned
decision could possibly lead to the arbitral outcome, substantive
integrity would be missing."7 However, if the reviewing court's
review of the record shows that the award is correct, it should be
enforced even if the arbitrator's law-finding, fact-finding, and law-
applying are faulty. Substantive integrity favors substance over form,
and in this situation the purpose of the statute is well-served where
the award fully protects the rights of the claimant.218
To summarize the proposal:
An arbitrator's failure to apply the applicable law through legal
reasoning would warrant a finding that an erroneous decision should
be vacated as lacking substantive integrity.
(1) Under the proposed standard, the court looks independently at
the record to first determine whether the arbitrator's decision is correct;
a correct decision ends the inquiry.
(2) If the decision is incorrect, the court closely examines the
arbitrator's law-finding for correctness.
expansive standard would render the arbitrator indistinguishable for a trial court and
eliminate many of the advantages of arbitration.
216. Professor Hayford correctly observes the weak inference of knowledge of the law
and conscious disregard created by an arbitrator's incorrect interpretation of the law and
the absence of a reasoned award. See Reigning in, supra note 171, at 128-32. However,
under the broader proposed standard of substantive integrity an incorrect decision
combined with the absence of a reasoned award creates a strong inference that the
arbitrator did not reason in good faith from the evidentiary materials in the record to the
decisional outcome.
217. A "reasoned decision" is distinguishable from a perfunctory one, since the latter
(but not the former) may describe the parties facts and evidence without analytically
applying the law to the facts to reach a legal conclusion. This standard is similar to the
"arbitrary and capricious" standard used by some courts.
218. Cf. Solomon v. CCMA, (1999) 20 I.L.J. 2960 (LC) (S. Afr.), available at
http://www.legalinfo.co.za (where the judge set aside an award, even though he conceded
correctness, because the Commissioner's reasoning was faulty).
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(3) Wrong choices of law or ignoring the law results in the setting
aside of an erroneous decision.
(4) If the law is correctly selected, the court evaluates the
arbitrator's fact-finding and law applying only to determine whether
the arbitrator's conclusions have been reasoned from the materials in
the record.
(5) Reasoned conclusions are entitled to deference, even though
the court would have reached a different result.
(6) The court may draw a negative inference regarding the
rationality of an erroneous award in the absence of a reasoned written
opinion.
This approach addresses the need to reconcile the public policy
of enforcing arbitration agreements contained in the FAA with that
reflected in statutes designed to protect workers. It also
acknowledges the responsibility of courts to protect the statutory
rights of the public and the propensity of courts to violate more
restrictive standards in order to respond to justice concerns created
by erroneous decisions in public policy cases."'
(2) The Importance of a Written Opinion
Particularly in public law cases, appellate review is necessary for
three reasons. First, courts are the primary guardians of public rights
granted by congressional enactments.22 ° Second, where private
arbitrators replace lower courts as the initial decision-makers in
statutory cases, judicial review permits higher courts to fulfill their
219. Halligan v. Piper Jaffray, Inc., 148 F.3d 197, 204 (2d Cir. 1998), is an example of
the latter tendency, where the arbitrators may have been quite wrong even though they
may not have manifestly disregarded the law in ruling against the Halligans. See also
Hayford, supra note 108, at 764-74 (bemoaning the courts' setting up nonstatutory
standards of review).
The "integrity review" standard suggests that in the debate among the circuits about
the permissibility of altering the standard of review by agreement, it would be
inappropriate for the parties to lower the standard of review. Moreover, in light of the
delicate balancing of FAA and statutory concerns the Bowen court's decision rejecting
even heightened judicial scrutiny of arbitration awards would seem to have the better of
the argument. See supra note 104.
220. See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (2000) (conferring jurisdiction
concurrently on district courts of the United States, state, and territorial courts); Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1998, 29 U.S.C. § 626 (1998) (authorizing judicial
enforcement through the Fair Labor Standards Act); Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 216(b) (1998) (conferring jurisdiction in federal and state courts to enforce rights under
the statute); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) (1994) (conferring jurisdiction in United States
courts over unlawful employment practices).
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enforcement obligation through appropriate supervision.12 Third, the
specter of review should enhance the level of care and quality
practiced by arbitrators in statutory arbitrations.222  These factors
make judicial review of employment arbitration awards essential to
the protection of statutory rights.
The written opinion is the vehicle that facilitates judicial
223review. In it, the arbitrator must state and justify the factual
findings and legal conclusions that resolve the dispute. 4 Opinion-
writing also provides many individual, institutional, and public
benefits that make it worthwhile for reasons other than judicial
review.225  However, at the forefront of its institutional and public
rewards are the quality of decision-making and meaningful judicial
221. See MARTINEAU, supra note 50, §§ 1.8, 1.9 (describing two functions of appellate
courts as error correction and law development including enforcing "the law as declared
by both judicial and legislative bodies").
222. Id. § 1.8 (noting a function of appellate review as preventing "a judge from
consciously acting in a manner that would constitute reversible error" and "caus[ing] a
judge to exercise greater caution to prevent unintentional error"); see also Christopher B.
Kaczmarek, Public Law Deserves Public Justice: Why Public Law Arbitrators Should Be
Required to Issue Written, Publishable Opinions, 4 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 285, 317-18
(2000) (noting the motivational effect of having to justify an award in an opinion).
223. See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 439 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (where
Justice Frankfurter argued that since an arbitrator's failure to follow the law would be
grounds for vacating the award, "appropriate means for judicial scrutiny must be implied,
in the form of some record or opinion, however informal, whereby such compliance will
appear, or want of it will upset the award"); Gorman, supra note 1, at 667 (setting forth
the view that the FAA's requirement of vacatur for "evident partiality" and "exceeding
their powers" assumes "that at least the barest of findings and reasons should be set forth
in an arbitral award").
224. See Abrams, supra note 202, at 585-87 (setting forth the elements of the arbitral
opinion).
225. See Kaczmarek, supra note 222, at 314-25 (discussing the individual, institutional
and public benefits of written opinions). South African Labour Court Judge Marcus, in
Dairybell (Pty) Ltd. v. CCMA, 1999 (10) BLLR 1033 (LC), available at http://www.
legalinfo.co.za, cited the following about the importance of written reasons for arbitration
awards under the South African Labor Relations Act of 1995:
There is a strong case to be made for the giving of reasons as an essential element
of administrative justice. The need for it has been sharply exposed by the
expanding law of judicial review now that so many decisions are [likely] to be
quashed or appealed.., on grounds of improper purpose, irrelevant
consideration [sic] and errors of law of various kinds. Unless the citizen can
discover the reasoning behind the decision, he may be unable to tell whether it is
reviewable or not and so he may be deprived of the protection of the law. A
right to reasons is therefore an indispensable part of a sound system of judicial
review. Natural justice may provide the best rubric for it since the giving of
reasons is required by the ordinary [person's] sense of justice. It is also a healthy
discipline for all who exercise power over others.
Id. $ 16. See generally infra text and accompanying notes 265-81 (discussing judicial
review under the 1995 Labour Relations Act of South Africa).
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review. The opinion-writing process focuses an arbitrator's
concentration on determining the legal rules for decision, sorting out
the facts made relevant by such decisional rules, and reasoning to the
conclusions to be drawn by applying the appropriate rules to the
facts.226 This deliberation requires a discipline that produces greater
clarity and better reasoned decisions than the simple oral or written
pronouncement of conclusions.227 The benefits of this painstaking
work go to the arbitrator and the parties, and in statutory arbitration,
to the public as well.2"
Despite these considerable benefits of opinion-writing, a
requirement that arbitral opinions be written remains uncertain and
controversial. Before the Court extended FAA coverage to
employment contracts in Gilmer, the Court had said more than once
that arbitrators were not obligated "to give [the court] their reasons
for an award." '229 In Gilmer, one of the employee's arguments against
the enforcement of the pre-dispute arbitration agreement was the
arbitral practice of not writing awards. This resulted, Gilmer argued,
226. Anecdotal evidence including the experience of the writer suggests that arbitrators
are often surprised at how writing the opinion changes the initial impressions of the case.
See Abrams, supra note 202, at 585 n.88 (saying that "[t]he very activity of expressing the
basis for decision channels an adjudicator's mind along rational lines" and noting the
following quote attributed to Felix Frankfurter: "we all feel much more responsible if we
have to sit down and write out why we think what we think"). These views are reinforced
by self-regulation theory in psychology, which holds that accountability is "another
variable that increases the importance of making the right decision". See ROY F.
BAUMEISTER ET AL., LOSING CONTROL-HoW AND WHY PEOPLE FAIL AT SELF-
REGULATION 92 (1994) (defining accountability as "any pressure on the person to defend
his or her decision or to personally accept bad consequences for making a wrong choice"
and elaborating "when people expect to have to justify their judgments, or even if they
merely think that their decisions will be made public, they try harder to be thorough...
[t]hus, various forms of accountability make people pay more attention, process
information more thoroughly, and hence reach more informed decisions and resist bias.")
227. See Patricia M. Wald, The Problem with the Courts: Black-Robed Bureaucracy, or
Collegiality Under Challenge?, 42 MD. L. REV. 766, 782 (1983) (describing her conviction
that every appellate decision "requires some statement of reasons," because "[t]he
discipline of writing even a few sentences or paragraphs explaining the basis for the
judgment insures a level of thought and scrutiny by the court that a bare signal of
affirmance, dismissal, or reversal does not").
228. See Kaczmarek, supra note 222, at 321-25 (noting these arguments and pointing
out that they are either overblown or outweighed by offsetting gains to the public).
229. See United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 598
(1960) (expressing the concern that "requir[ing] opinions free of ambiguity may lead
arbitrators to play it safe by writing no supporting opinions" and noting thait "a well-
reasoned opinion tends to engender confidence in the integrity of the process and aids in
clarifying the underlying agreement"); Barnhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198,
203 (1956) (making the point that arbitration as a forum is radically different from a court
in part because arbitrators need not give their reasons for their results).
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in "a lack of public knowledge of employers' discriminatory policies,
an inability to obtain effective appellate review, and a stifling of the
development of the law., 23" Rather than affirming the arbitral
practice of not writing opinions, the Court responded to this
argument by implicitly acknowledging the ill-effects of the practice
and pointing out that the New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE")
imposed a writing requirement upon arbitrators and required public
access to the awards.2 1 Because the extent of any writing requirement
contemplated by the Court in Gilmer is not clear, arguably the Gilmer
decision extending the FAA to statutory cases both raises new
grounds for requiring a written opinion and fails to preclude
reviewing courts from considering the absence of such opinions in
reaching vacatur decisions. A written opinion requirement or
negative inference in the absence of an opinion would create an
incentive for arbitrators to write reasoned awards to improve their
chances of passing muster under the substantive integrity standard,
rather than to eschew written reasoned awards in order to avoid
scrutiny under the stricter "manifest disregard" standard.232
Though written opinions have been a part of the norm in labor
arbitration,233 they have been an anomaly in commercial arbitration.
Written opinions are thought to compromise the confidentiality of the
proceeding, increase the cost and decrease the efficiency of
arbitration, and threaten finality by increasing the probability of
vacatur.235 However, labor arbitrators have traditionally written
opinions without substantially compromising confidentiality, cost
effectiveness, efficiency, or finality,236 and, in any event, in this new
230. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 31 (1991).
231. The NYSE requirement of written awards, names of the parties, and a summary of
the issues is not an opinion-writing requirement. Unlike the award, the opinion sets forth
the arbitrator's reasoning. See Alleyne, supra note 1, at 414 (noting the distinction
between awards and opinions).
232. Note that this approach chooses the stick of increasing the probability of setting
aside an award in the absence of a written decision rather than Professor Hayford's carrot
of refraining from applying non-statutory standards in order to encourage arbitrators to
write reasoned decisions. See Reigning in, supra note 171, at 140; New Paradigm, supra
note 171, at 501-02. See generally Kaczmarek, supra note 222.
233. See Alleyne, supra note 1, at 412 (noting that "[o]pinion-writing is part of labor
arbitration's culture, its accepted unwritten rules").
234. See GABRIEL M. WILNER, DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 29.06 (rev.
ed. 2000)
235. See Kaczmarek, supra note 222, at 325-30; Gorman, supra note 1, at 667-68.
236. See LeRoy & Feuille, supra note 7, at 19 (showing that district courts confirmed
approximately 72% of the awards from 1960-1991 and 70% during 1991-2001, while
appellate courts confirmed approximately 71% of the award in the earlier period and 66%
in the later period).
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era of arbitrating public rights, some sacrifice of confidentiality may
be warranted.37
Moreover, many distinguished and thoughtful observers and
practitioners have argued that opinion-writing by arbitrators deciding
statutory cases is essential.38  Because the substantive integrity
standard requires a showing of justifiability, an appellate court may
not be able to perform its reviewing function under the standard
without a written opinion. For example, consider an arbitrator's
decision denying the equipment manager's claim of "hostile or
abusiveness environment" after the Supreme Court's Harris decision.
If the arbitrator simply announces that the company is not liable
without giving reasons for this conclusion, it may be impossible for
the reviewing court to determine that in reaching this decision the
arbitrator incorrectly identified and applied the pre-Harris rule that a
psychological injury must be shown. In this event, contrary to the
assurances of Gilmer, review would not be "sufficient to ensure that
[the arbitrator complied] with the requirements of the statute." '239
(3) The Decided Cases
Contrary to the Second Circuit's decision, the substantive
integrity standard cuts in favor of vacatur in DiRussa, where the
arbitrators awarded damages but erroneously declined to award
237. See George Nicolau, Scrutiny of Arbitration Forums Focuses on Fairness, NAT'L
L.J. B7 (Oct. 5, 1998) (opining that written opinions will soon be the standard in
employment cases); Gorman, supra note 1, at 668; Kaczmarek, supra note 222, at 326
(arguing that public law trumps confidentiality).
238. See, e.g., Nicolau, supra note 237 (explaining that the guidelines go beyond the
protocol by recognizing that written opinions are even more important in statutory
disputes, "because they enable claimants, prospective claimants, the public and
administrative agencies charged with enforcing anti-discrimination statutes to know how
the arbitrators reached their conclusions and to understand whether the rights at issue
have been vindicated" (emphasis added)); Zack, supra note 9, C.5 (providing that an
arbitrator should issue an opinion); STATEMENT AND GUIDELINES OF THE NATIONAL
ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS, GUIDELINES ON ARBITRATION OF STATUTORY CLAIMS
UNDER EMPLOYER-PROMULGATED SYSTEMS $ IV (adopted May 21, 1997), available at
http://www.naarb.org/guide-lines.htm. (last visited August 11, 2001) (providing for an
opinion that "recite[s] findings of fact and the reasoning for conclusions of law contained
in the opinion and award" and urging the arbitrator to "identify and deal with all statutory
issues raised, being mindful of the standards of review which may apply"); COMMISSION
ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS-FINAL REPORT, U.S.
DEP'TS OF COMMERCE AND LABOR, available at http://www.ilr.Cornell.edu/library/
e_archive/gov-reports/default.html (last visited August 11, 2001) (recommending "a
written opinion by the arbitrator explaining the rationale for the result; and sufficient
review to ensure that the result is consistent with the governing laws").
239. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 32 n.4 (citing Shearson/
American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 232 (1987)).
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attorneys fees despite the statutory mandate 4.2 " The arbitrators did
not heed the employee's argument that he was "entitled to" attorneys
fees under the statute, nor did they give reasons for denying it.2" In
that case, three possibilities account for the decision: (1) the
arbitrator knew and ignored the law, (2) the arbitrator did not know
the law but engaged in reasoning on the point, or (3) the arbitrator
did not engage in reasoning, since no legitimate reasoning could have
produced the outcome. Under either possibility (1) or (3) the award
would lack substantive integrity, since the arbitrators would not have
attempted reasoning in either case. Under possibility (2) the
combination of an erroneous decision plus the absence of written
reasons create a strong inference that the arbitrator did not reach the
decision to deny attorneys fees through reasoning under the
applicable law.242
Halligan is a different story. In that case there was no evidence
of manifest disregard.2 3  Though the record before the arbitrators
contained strong evidence of age discrimination, the company had
also produced evidence supporting its claim that it had been
motivated by Halligan's performance problems.2" Indeed, the district
court judge, whose refusal to vacate the award was reversed by the
Second Circuit, said:
I cannot conclude that the panel did in fact disregard the parties'
burdens of proof .... Crediting one witness over another does not
constitute manifest disregard of the law [and] this Court's role is
not to second-guess the fact-finding done by the Panel. Because
there is factual as well as legal support for the Panel's ultimate
conclusion, I determine that the Panel did not manifestly disregard
the law.245
Had the arbitrators in Halligan written a reasoned decision based
on their analysis of the evidence in the record, vacatur would
probably have been improper under the substantive integrity standard.
A reasoned decision might have produced the outcome in Halligan,
even if a majority of judges might have disagreed with it.
246
240. DiRussa v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 936 F. Supp. 104,106-07 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
241. Id. at 106.
242. Evidence that DiRussa indicated his entitlement to attorneys fees several times
during the arbitration including his statement of claims received into evidence, his opening
statement, and his brief reinforce this inference. Id.
243. See Poser, supra note 161, at 481-82 (arguing that the Second Circuit only paid lip
service to the manifest disregard standard in Halligan, basing its holding instead on an
erroneous finding of fact).
244. Id.
245. Halligan v. Piper Jaffray, Inc., 148 F.3d 197, 200 (2d Cir. 1998).
246. STEPHEN BURTON, JUDGING IN GOOD FAITH 35 (Jules Coleman ed., 1992).
(4) Substantive Integrity Compared
The standards proposed by Professors Malin and Ladenson,
Poser, and Hayford fail to fully accommodate the need to balance
FAA and statutory policies. Unreasoned arbitral fact-finding may
undermine public policy as much as unreasoned statutory
interpretation. For example, in Halligan the Second Circuit vacated
the award denying relief to the grievant for age discrimination finding
manifest disregard in the arbitrator's ignoring the law, the evidence or
both.247 In light of the strong evidence of age discrimination the court
found the arbitrator's factfinding erroneous."' In the court's view, the
effect of this error was to deny the employee the protection of the
ADEA.2" An approach that would leave an arbitrator's factfinding
unreviewable in every statutory case-such as the one suggested by
Professors Malin and Ladenson-may undermine public policy.
20
On the other hand, looking at the arbitral outcome without
reference to reasoning would usurp the arbitral function. By
imposing a mens rea component, manifest disregard-unlike the
substantive integrity standard-deems the public interest reflected in
statutes adequately served with the assurance that the arbitrator is
not deliberately behaving irresponsibly. However, it does not
account for the harm to public values that derives from the
arbitrator's inadvertent failure to perform the essential reasoning
function of the job. The answer is not to focus on the outcome alone
as Professor Poser would have it, but to ensure that the award was
reasoned. Even though insisting on reasoning does not guarantee a
correct result, it greatly increases the odds. The remaining margin of
error may be an accommodation to FAA policy that statutory policy
must make.5
247. Halligan, 148 F.3d at 204.
248. Id.
249. Id. Even though one might disagree with the Court in Halligan, as suggested
above in the text and note 247, the Court's finding illustrates a potential problem with
arbitral factfinding that may require setting aside the award.
250. It might be argued that such scrutiny of arbitral factfinding will undermine finality.
However, this claim is subject to the rejoinder that the protection of important public
rights justifies the sacrifice of some finality.
251. See Gorman, supra note 1, at 673 (citing the courts' power to vacate awards on
public policy grounds under Misco, the "clearly repugnant" standard in NLRB deferral
cases, and deference to a permissible reading of a statute by an administrative agency and
saying: "Although there may be nuances of difference in these formulations, they all
express the idea that courts will tolerate a margin of error in the application of law-in
part due to the presumed capabilities of the initial decision maker, but also due to
considerations of litigative efficiency").
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While Professor Hayford has made a Herculean effort to limit
courts to section 10(a) review and the manifest disregard and public
policy standards narrowly construed, his approach does not recognize
the coexistence of FAA and other statutory policies or accede to the
Courts' determination to guarantee some modicum of justice in
public policy cases. The substantive integrity standard balances
competing public policies by preserving a judicial role that advances
statutory policy while giving reasoned arbitral outcomes the finality
contemplated by national labor policy.252
Il. The South African Experiment
A. The "Justifiability" Standard of Review
The South African Labour Appeal Court's treatment of judicial
review of arbitration awards under the 1995 Labour Relations Act
("LRA") supports the notion of a distinction between statutory and
contractual cases. The LRA is a forward-looking piece of legislation
that sought to cull the positive features of labor law systems
throughout the developed world and integrate them into a world class
statute governing labor and employment law in democratic South
Africa.253
252. See id. at 669, pointing out the following:
It is one thing when an arbitrator deciding a grievance under a collective
agreement makes a foolish error in interpreting or applying the contract terms; it
is unlikely that a significant public policy will be impaired and, in any event, the
parties are free to attempt promptly to rectify the error through private dealings
at the next contract renegotiation. When the arbitrator's error relates to
statutory interpretation or application, there is legitimate concern that a larger
public objective has been frustrated. It is also clear that the balancing called for
where public policies compete is not appropriate where the labor and
employment claims are contractual. Yet, as already noted, it is well-settled that
even where purely contractual claims are before the arbitrator, the court will
exercise its common law power to refuse to enforce contracts as interpreted in
arbitration awards that violate public policy or law.
Cf. Hayford, supra note 108. It should be noted that there is no uniformity of views
among arbitrators about whether it is appropriate for an arbitrator to decide questions of
public policy that are not incorporated into the contract. In those cases where the
arbitrator has a more narrow jurisdictional view, it is possible for the award to draw its
essence from the agreement and still be set aside on public policy grounds. Public policy
cases may have more to do with the validity of the contract as read by the arbitrator than
with any defect in the arbitrator's reasoning process. They do require the reviewing court
to examine the contract independently as interpreted to prevent its violation of public
policy.
253. See Calvin William Sharpe, Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards Under the New
South Africa Labour Relations Act of 1995, 33 CASE W. RES. UNIV. J. INT'L L. 277 (2002).
One of these features is a right enjoyed by all employees not to
be unfairly dismissed and to have any dispute about the fairness of a
dismissal referred to the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation, and
Arbitration ("CCMA").25 4 When a dispute is referred, the CCMA
(through one of its approximately 400 commissioners located
throughout South Africa's nine provinces) must first attempt to
mediate the dispute and if the parties fail to reach a settlement it must
then arbitrate the dispute.255 Because of the breadth of coverage
under the LRA, the CCMA receives approximately 80,000 cases
annually, of which approximately 14,000 go to arbitration.256 These
numbers are staggering in a relatively small country of approximately
forty-four million people and a workforce of approximately seventeen
million."7
254. Sections 185 and 191 provide as follows:
185 Right Not To Be Unfairly Dismissed
Every employee has the right not to be unfairly dismissed.
191 Disputes About Unfair Dismissals
(1) If there is a dispute about the fairness of a dismissal the dismissed
employee may refer the dispute in writing within 30 days of the date of
dismissal to-
(b) the Commission ....
Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 §§ 185, 191, 4 JSRSA 2-165, 2-215, 2-216 (1998).
255. Section 191 further provides:
(4) The Commission must attempt to resolve the dispute through conciliation.
(5) If... a commissioner has certified that the dispute remains unresolved, or if
30 days have expired since the council or the Commission received the referral
and the dispute remains unresolved-
(a) the... Commission must arbitrate the dispute at the request of the
employee if-
(i)the employee has alleged that the reason for dismissal is related to
the employee's conduct or capacity[;] ...
(ii)the employee has alleged that the reason for dismissal is that the
employer made continued employment intolerable; or
(iii)the employee does not know the reason for dismissal; ....
Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 § 191.
256. See Sharpe, supra note 253, at 5-6.
257. See Economic and Financial Data for South Africa at http://www.resbank.
co.za/economics/zaflinkl.html; Economically Active Population Estimates and
Projections: South Africa at http://wwwlaborsta.ilo.org. Compare EEOC's receipt of
approximately 81,000 charges of employment discrimination in 2001 in the United States,
population of approximately 280 million and workforce of 141 million. U.S. Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, Enforcement Statistics and Litigation at
http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/enforcement.html (last visited March 9, 2002); U.S. Census
Bureau, Population Estimates at http://eire.census.gov/popest/estimates.php.
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The Labour Court has jurisdiction to review arbitration
proceedings conducted by the CCMA,25s and the Labour Appeal
Court is the highest court with jurisdiction over labor matters.25 9 Two
sections of the LRA bear upon judicial review of arbitration awards.
One is quite similar to federal law in the United States. It permits
setting aside an award because the Commissioner committed
misconduct or gross irregularity, the Commissioner exceeded her
powers, or the award was improperly obtained-what might generally
be called, arbitral misconduct. 26' This is a narrow standard of review.
The other section expressly provides that despite the first provision,
the Labour Court can review any act of the CCMA on "any grounds
that are permissible in law" including the South African
Constitution.26'
258. Section 157 provides as follows:
(1) Subject to the constitution and section 173 [defining the jurisdiction of the
Labour Appeal Court], and except where this Act provides otherwise, the
Labour Court has exclusive jurisdiction in respect of all matters that elsewhere in
terms of Act or in terms of any other law are to be determined by the Labour
Court [e.g., § 145].
Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 § 157, 4 JSRSA 2-210 (1998).
259. Section 167 provides in part:
167 Establishment and Status of Labour Appeal Court
(2) The Labour Appeal Court is the final court of appeal in respect of all
judgments and orders made by the Labour Court in respect of the matters within
its exclusive jurisdiction.
Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 § 167, 4 JSRSA 2-212.
260. Section 145 provides as follows:
145 Review of Arbitration Awards
Any party to a dispute who alleges a defect in any arbitration proceedings under
the auspices of the Commission may apply to the Labour Court for an order
setting aside the arbitration award-
(b) if the alleged defect involves corruption, within six weeks of the date that
the applicant discovers the corruption.
A defect referred to in subsection (1), means-
(a) that the commissioner-
committed misconduct in relation to the duties of the commissioner as
an arbitrator;
committed a gross irregularity in the conduct of the arbitration
proceeding; or
exceeded the commissioner's powers; or
that an award has been improperly obtained.
Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 § 145, 4 JSRSA 2-207.
261. Section 158 of the Labour Relations Act reads as follows:
158 Powers of Labour Court
(1) The Labour Court may
(g) despite section 145, review the performance or purported performance
A strongly held view among South African lawyers and Labour
Court judges had been that the second provision permitted a broader
review of the merits of the arbitration award, while the first called for
a narrow scope of review.262 Even though considerable pressure
existed among lawyers and Labour Court judges to read the second
section as requiring a broader standard of review, the Labour Appeal
Court took a different approach. In Carephone (Pty) Ltd. and
Marcus NO, the Labour Appeal Court interpreted the two sections
together in a way that suggested a scope of review based on whether
the arbitration was public or private.263 Under this approach if the
award resulted from a private, voluntary arbitration under section 33
of the Arbitration Act of 1965,264 the scope of review would be
narrow. On the other hand, if a CCMA commissioner issued the
award under the LRA of 1995, where arbitration is compulsory, the
standard of review would be broader in order to further the public
purposes of the LRA. The CCMA commissioner would not only
have to refrain from misconduct but her award would have to be
"justifiable."
The narrow standard under section 33 of the Arbitration Act,
like section 10(a) of the FAA, is concerned only about procedural
integrity. It does not permit the reviewing court to set aside an award
on the basis of error alone. Carephone's broader justifiability
of any function provided for in the Act or any act or omission of any person
or body in terms of this Act on any grounds that are permissible in law ....
Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 § 158, 4 JSRSA 2-211. See infra note 265 and
accompanying text.
262. See, e.g., Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd. v. CCMA, 1998 (19) I.L.J. 892, 899 $ 27.8-
28 (LC) (referring to section 33 of the Constitution as a ground permissible in law, PJ
Pretorious AJ held that Commissioners performed administrative actions that were
constitutionally required to be "justifiable in relation to the reasons given for it").
263. 1998 (19) I.L.J. 1425 (LAC).
264. Section 33 of the Arbitration Act 42 of 1965 reads as follows:
(1) Where-
(a) any member of an arbitration tribunal has misconducted himself in
relation to his duties as arbitrator or umpire; or
(b) an arbitration tribunal has committed any gross irregularity in the
conduct of the arbitration proceedings or has exceeded its powers; or
(c) an award has been improperly obtained,
the court may, on the application of any party to the reference after due
notice to the other party or parties, make an order setting award aside.
(2) An application pursuant to this section shall be made within six weeks after
the publication of the award to the parties: Provided that when the setting aside
of the award is requested on the ground of corruption, such application shall be
made with six weeks after the discovery of the corruption and in any case not
later than three years after the date on which the award was so published.
Arbitration Act 42 of 1965, 1 JSRSA § 33, 2-10 (1998).
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 54
January 2003] INTEGRITY REVIEW OF ARBITRATION AWARDS 365
standard, informed by section 158 of the LRA and section 33 of the
South African Constitution, expressed a broader concern; but did it
mean that the commissioner's award has to be "right" on the merits,
requiring a reviewing court to set aside an erroneous decision?
Applying section 33 of the Constitution, the Carephone court
held that the merits should be considered only to determine whether
the outcome is rationally justifiable in terms of the reasons given for
it.265 Spelling out the "justifiability" standard, the court formulated
the following test: "[I]s there a rational objective basis justifying the
connection made by the [arbitrator] between the material properly
available to him and the conclusion he or she eventually arrived
at?,,""
The court was not to consider the merits of the award to
substitute its opinion on the "correctness thereof" in the case of a
decision it deemed incorrect.267 Thus, Carephone created a subtle
265. Section 33 of the South Africa Constitution reads as follows:
Section 33 Just Administrative Action
(1) Everyone has the right to administrative action that is lawful, reasonable and
procedurally fair.
(2) Everyone whose rights have been adversely affected by administrative action
has the right to be given written reasons.
(3) National legislation must be enacted to give effect to these rights, and must-
(a) provide for the review of administrative action by a court or, where
appropriate, an independent and impartial tribunal;
(b) impose a duty on the state to give effect to the rights in subsections (1)
and (2); and
(c) promote an efficient administration.
CONST. OF S. AFR. § 33 (1997), reprinted in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE
WORLD (Gilbert H. Flanz ed., Inter-University Associates, Inc. trans., 1997).
Judge Froneman makes the point in Carephone that sections 33(1) and (2) should be
read as incorporating item 23(2) of Schedule 6 of the Constitution until the legislation
envisaged in sections 33(3) is enacted. Item 23(2) reads:
Every person has the right to-
(a) lawful administrative action where any of their rights or interests is
affected or threatened;
(b) procedurally fair administrative action where any of their rights or
legitimate expectations is affected or threatened;
(c) be furnished with reasons in writing for administrative action which
affects any of their rights or interests unless the reasons for that action have
been made public; and
(d) administrative action which is justifiable in relation to the reasons given
for it where any of their rights is affected or threatened.
CONST. OF S. AFR. supra, § 23(2); see also Carephone, 19 I.L.J. at 1431 16.
266. 19 I.L.J. at 1435 37.
267. The following language captures the Court's view:
In determining whether administrative action is justifiable in terms of the reasons
given for it, value judgments will have to be made which will, almost inevitably,
involve the consideration of the "merits" of the matter in some way or another.
distinction that asked courts to look at the merits, not in order to rule
on them but only to ensure that Commissioners were issuing reasoned
awards. The former would be an appeal, not permitted under the
LRA, while the latter is permissible as review under the statute.268
Though the Carephone justifiability standard has been
challenged both in the Labour Appeal Court and the Labour Court,
the problem may lie more in the Labour Court's application of the
standard in some cases than the standard itself.27 0 Indeed, both the
Labour Appeal Court and the Labour Court have interpreted the
"gross irregularity" standard of section 145(2)(a)(ii) of the LRA in a
way that seems virtually indistinguishable from the Labour Appeal
As long as the judge determining this issue is aware that he or she enters the
merits not in order to substitute his or her own opinion on the correctness
thereof, but to determine whether the outcome is rationally justifiable, the
process will be in order.
Id. T 36.
268. See infra note 271.
269. See Toyota S. Africa Motors (Pty) Ltd. v. Radebe, 2000 (3) BLLR 243 (LAC),
available at http://www.legalinfo.co.za. See also Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd. v. A
Ramdaw NO, (2000) 21 I.L.J. 1232 (LAC), in which Wallis AJ quoted Nicholson JA in
Toyota South Africa Motors directly:
I intend dealing briefly with the last mentioned ground, namely the justifiability
of the award, as I have certain misgivings about whether it constitutes an
independent ground upon which an award can be attacked. As such it is not part
of section 145, which restricts an applicant to misconduct, corruption, gross
irregularity and the excess of powers. I am not sure that Froneman DJP was
importing the last mentioned ground into section 145 and I believe the mention
of it in the passage above was in any event an obiter dictum. I have two
difficulties with importing this ground into the Act. The first relates to the
difference between appeals and reviews and the second relates to the
constitutional implications of section 145.
The reference by Froneman DJP [in Carephone] to the constitutional provisions
must be seen in the context of the specific grounds or review in section 145. My
misgivings relate, therefore, to the notion that the grounds set out in that section
are not the only avenue open to a party to challenge an award. It was not
suggested in this case that the grounds set out in section 145 were
unconstitutional and they are fully operative until declared unconstitutional. If
there was such a constitutional challenge the court would have to evaluate
whether the creation of the CCMA and the other machinery of the Act provides
sufficient justification for the limitation of the rights of administrative justice
provided in the constitution. Although, as I have mentioned, it is not necessary
for the purposes of this judgment to decide the issue, I have grave doubts that the
concept of an award being justifiable as to the reasons given is an independent
ground of review.
Shoprite, 21 I.L.J. at 1243-44 1[ 41-42.
270. See Metcash Trading (Pty) Ltd. v. Sithole NO, 1998 (4) BLLR 351 (LC), available
at http://www.legalinfo.co.za; Sharpe, supra note 253 (discussing "misapplication" cases).
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Court's articulation of the justifiability standard in Carephone 1
Both the "justifiability" and the "gross irregularity" standards pivot
upon the arbitrator's reasoning-in South African parlance whether
the arbitrator "applied the mind."
B. The Cases
Confirming the workability of the Carephone standard and the
one proposed in this Article, the South African Labour Courts have
successfully applied the "justifiability-gross irregularity" standard
despite the subtlety of the distinction between review and appeal.
Not surprisingly, the vast majority of awards are upheld on review
under the Carephone standard. They tend to fall into three
categories. First, in the easy cases, the decision is correct and the
Labour Court dismisses the application or the award is not justifiable
and is set aside. Second, in the harder cases the award is wrong but
justifiable. Third, in the misapplication cases, right or wrong, the
Court sets aside the award because it misapplies the standard.
Though the easy cases abound,272 one example will demonstrate
the Labour Court's approach in such cases. In Dairybell (Pty) v.
271. For example in Radebe the Labour Appeal Court set aside an award as grossly
irregular because the Commissioner believed either that "a clean disciplinary record and
long service always precluded dismissal as an appropriate sanction for misconduct or that
the existence of some other lesser sanction, for example suspension or demotion, excluded
the appropriateness of dismissal." Shoprite, 21 I.L.J. at 1232 $ 94. The Radebe court was
described as saying that "[t]his approach was so deficient in law, logic and sound labour
relations practice that it was said to be 'indefensible on any legitimate ground.' ... There
was 'a yawning chasm between the sanction which the court would have imposed and that
which the commissioner imposed."' Id. (internal citations omitted).
Though Wallis AJ rejected Carephone's conclusion that arbitrating commissioners
are engaged in administrative action and refused to apply the justifiability standard, he
adopted the same standard for gross irregularity in Shoprite as the Labour Appeal Court
did in Radebe. Id. In Shoprite, the judge contested the inferences drawn from the
presence or lack of evidence and considered his conclusions wrong. Yet, he recognized
that the commissioner was in a better position than he to rule on credibility and that he
had weighed the evidence in reaching his conclusion, making it inappropriate of the
Labour Court to conclude "that no reasonable commissioner could in the proper exercise
of his functions have made that award." Id. 96. The judge also opined that the award
lacked "justifiability" and would have set aside under that standard. Id. 95. However,
gross irregularity as interpreted in Radebe and Shoprite seems the same as Carephone
review, i.e., "[n]o reasonable commissioner could in the proper exercise of his function
have made the award" sounds the same as "whether the award was justifiable on all the
materials before the commissioner." If a reasonable commissioner properly exercising his
function could have made the award, it would be justifiable under Carephone. Under both
standards the only concern should be whether there was a legitimate reasoning process.
272. See, e.g., Aitken v. Khoza, 2000 (9) LC 1.11.17 (LC) (Stein AJ); Gqibela v. W.
Driefontein Mine, 2000 (9) LC 1.11.6 (LC) (Loxton AJ); Waverly Blankets Ltd. v. CCMA,
2000 (9) LC 1.11.28 (LC) (Mpofu AJ); Abrahams v. S. African Cultural History Museum,
CCMA, the arbitrator, without furnishing reasons, ordered the
company to compensate the employee for the equivalent of six
months salary, despite the arbitrator's finding that the employee had
engaged in misconduct.2 73 The Labour Court set aside the award,
because it could not comprehend the arbitrator's ruling without
reasons (however brief) demonstrating the rational relationship
between the materials before the arbitrator and the conclusion
reached.2 74 Elaborating, the court reasoned:
A consideration of the Commissioner['s] reasons makes it
impossible to ascertain precisely what misconduct was found to
have been proved and why the employee was acquitted of other
charges. The Commissioner's discussion of the appropriate
sanction suggests that he found some misconduct to have been
proved but the precise nature of that misconduct is nowhere stated.
Where, as in the present case, there are several charges of
misconduct, each ought to be separately dealt with and the
arbitrator's analysis and conclusions in relation to each count ought
to be clearly set out. It is only in this way that the arbitrator's
reasoning and conclusions will be comprehensible. In my view, the
275standard of justifiability has not been met in the present matter.
Because the Commissioner reached an apparently wrong
decision and did not supply reasons, he deprived the court of a means
of evaluating whether a rationally objective basis supported the
conclusion . 6 The court noted facilitating judicial review, educating
citizens, and establishing the legitimacy of the administrative process
as important purposes for supplying reasons supporting the award.277
Like Dairybell, other easy cases reveal a straightforward application
of the "justifiability-gross irregularity" standard.278
1999 Case No C89/98 (LC), available at http://www.legalinfo.co.za; E. Rand Gold &
Uranium Co. v. CCMA, 1999 Case No. J1351/97 (LC), available at
http://www.legalinfo.co.za; Pritchard Cleaning Servs. v. Lebea, 1999 Case No. J2341/98
(LC) (Ngwenya, AJ); Purefresh Foods (Pty) Ltd. v. Dayal, 1999 (8) LC 1.11.23 (LC)
available at http://www.legalinfo.co.za; Themba Mtshali v. CCMA, 1999 Case No. J3103/98
(LC), available at http://www.legalinfo.co.za; University of the N. v. Nobriega, 1999 (8) LC
1.11.33 (LC); OD Zaayman v. CCMA, 1999 (20) I.J.J. 412 (LC).
273. 1999 (10) BLLR 1033 (LC), available at http://www.legalinfo.co.za.
274. Id. lT[ 17, 19.
275. Id. 17.
276. On the importance of supplying reasons, see Judge Marcus's remarks, supra note
225.
277. Id.; see supra notes 234-54 and accompanying text.
278. See Reutech Def. Indus. (Pty) Ltd. v. Govender, 2000 (9) BLLR 1101 (LC),
available at http://www.legalinfo.co.za (where the Commissioner's ignoring a positive lab
test and inexplicably not awarding full back pay despite a finding that the company failed
to prove intoxication led to the setting aside of the award under the Carephone standard);
Malelane Toyota v. CCMA, 1999 (6) BLLR 555 (LC), available at http://www.legalinfo.
co.za (where the Court set aside an award in favor of an employee dismissed for fraud
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The harder cases provide more assurance that Labour Court
judges appreciate the distinction between the Carephone standard of
review and an appeal. In these cases, judges avoid the pressure to set
aside awards that they believe are both justifiable and wrongly
decided. For example, in Metro Cash & Carry Ltd. v. Le Roux, the
Commissioner found that the employee's dismissal was an excessive
sanction, even though the employee had used undue force in
assaulting a customer and had failed to defuse the escalating
hostilities."9 The Commissioner's decision was premised upon the
customer's provocation of the employee and the award ordered a six-
week suspension. The Labour Court relied on Carephone to dismiss
the company's application for review and revealed an acute
awareness of the distinction between a review and appeal:
The conclusions reached by the [Commissioner] ... in making his
arbitration award [are] such that I do not necessarily agree on the
correctness of the outcome thereof.
However, in reviewing arbitration awards of the CCMA the
Labour Court must leave some room for differing opinions, as long
as those opinions are justifiable in relation to the reasons given for
[them].
This is not an easy test but I believe that the Labour Court
should heed the warning by the Labour Appeal Court and not
enter the merits of such arbitration award with a view to substitute
the Court's opinion on the correctness thereof.'8
The Labour Court showed similar restraint in City Lodge Hotels
Ltd. v. Gildenhuys NO.28 In that case, the Commissioner ordered the
reinstatement of an employee who had been terminated for
improperly removing company property."2 The award was based on a
record containing conflicting evidence on the issue of guilt, and the
company's application cited evidence supporting the guilt of the
employee. 3  Nonetheless, the Labour Court dismissed the
application saying that the weighing of evidence is a matter for the
Commissioner rather than the court unless the decision gives
"manifestly excessive or manifestly inadequate weight.., to a
issued under the mistaken belief that the Commissioner could only consider the
company's evidence submitted at its internal disciplinary hearing and not the more
complete evidence establishing the fraud at the arbitration hearing).
279. 1999 (4) BLLR 351, (LC), available at http://www.legalinfo.co.za.
280. Id. $$ 12-14.
281. Case No. J3054/98 (LC), available at http://www.legalinfo.co.za.
282. Id. $[ 4.
283. Id.
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relevant consideration.""28  In reaching this conclusion the court
acknowledged the difficulties "in interfering on review with decision-
making functions involving matters of judgement and evaluation.
'28 5
Ultimately, the court was faithful to its obligation not to interfere
with the award on review, "notwithstanding factors pointing to a
suspicion of misconduct on the part of [the employee] .286
In this category of cases, judges have shown an ability to
distinguish between justifiability and correctness. They have been
able to limit their consideration of the merits to the Carephone
question of whether the outcome is "rationally justifiable." The
South African experiment provides evidence that careful judges are
capable of applying the standard of substantive integrity proposed in
this Article. 7 It also reinforces the significance of written opinions in
ensuring the successful application of the standard.
Conclusion
The sharp turn in the last decade from judicial to arbitral
enforcement of statutory rights can lead to either an enhancement or
a diminution of statutory protections.288  Two keys to the eventual
outcome will be the quality of arbitral performance in this new area
of responsibility and the effectiveness of judicial monitoring. These
factors are symbiotically related, since arbitrators are likely to be
more careful if their work product is subject to more than perfunctory
judicial scrutiny. Yet, the enhancement of statutory protections turns
on the greater access to enforcement that arbitration can provide.
Such access depends upon preserving the cost, informality, speed, and
284. Id. T 33. It should be noted that the Labour Court's observation about excessively
over or undervaluing the weight of evidence as a basis for vacatur supports the current
proposal that both the arbitrator's factfinding and lawfinding should be subject to integrity
review.
285. Id. 34.
286. Id. 91 35.
287. Of course, some judges are more capable than others, and the category of
misapplication cases demonstrates the point. See, e.g., Metcash Trading (Pty) Ltd. v.
Sithole NO, 1998 Case No. J1079/97 (LC), available at http://www.legalinfo.co.za (where
the judge set aside an award, because the arbitrator applied a plausible interpretation of
the applicable law that was different from the one that the judge thought should be
applied); Solomon v. CCMA, 1999 (20) I.L.J. 2960 (LC), available at
http://www.legalinfo.co.za (where the judge set aside an award, even though he conceded
correctness, because the Commissioner's reasoning was faulty); and Eddels SA (Pty) Ltd.
v. Sewcharan, 2000 (21) I.L.J. 1344 (LC) (where the judge set aside the award as too
legalistic).
288. The consequences of a qualitative forum change brought on by Gilmer make "no
change in the status quo" an unlikely third choice.
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finality advantages of arbitration over litigation. Judicial review
should be effective but not so overbearing as to negate these
advantages.
In this Article, I have proposed a substantive integrity standard of
review that accomplishes effective monitoring of arbitral performance
while preserving the advantages of arbitration as a forum for
enforcing statutory employment rights. Under this standard, the
court looks independently at the record first to determine whether
the arbitrator's decision is correct; a correct decision ends the matter.
If the decision is incorrect, the court closely examines the arbitrator's
law-finding for correctness. If the law is correctly selected, the court
evaluates the arbitrator's fact-finding and law applying only to
determine whether the arbitrator's conclusions have been reasoned
from the materials in the record. Reasoned conclusions are entitled
to deference, even though the court would have reached a different
result. I have argued that an appropriate level of judicial scrutiny is
possible only when a written opinion explains the arbitrator's
reasoning; thus, the absence of a such an opinion supports a negative
inference regarding the rationality of an erroneous award.
This Article demonstrates first that this approach is grounded in
the professional integrity of the arbitrator. Second, it is informed by
the need to reconcile the sometimes competing policies of the FAA
and employment statutes. Third, it recognizes the judicial
responsibility and predisposition to protect public values embodied in
congressional enactments. Finally, it offers empirical support for the
workability of the proposed standard on a grand scale in South Africa
under the Labour Relations Act of 1995.
My hope is that the substantive integrity review standard will help
courts and arbitrators to appreciate each other's roles in meeting their
shared responsibility to enforce statutory rights in the employment
setting. Under this approach, American workers in this new era are
more likely to realize the protections intended by Congress in a broad
range of statutes designed to promote fairness in the workplace.

